Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors by Shane, Peter M.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 8
2001
Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore




Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. (2001) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol29/iss2/8





DISAPPEARING DEMOCRACY: HOW BUSH V. GORE UNDERMINED 
THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS 
 





























Recommended citation: Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore 
Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535 
(2001).  
535 
DISAPPEARING DEMOCRACY: HOW BUSH V. GORE 
UNDERMINED THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO VOTE 
FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS 
PETER M. SHANE* 
 I. THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT ..................................................  537 
 II. BUSH V. GORE AND VOTE TABULATION AS MASS ADJUDICATION.......................  550 
A. Equal Protection and Due Process in Bush v. Gore....................................  550 
B. Applying Due Process I: The Hypothetical Case of Gore v. Harris.............  553 
C. Applying Due Process II: The Real Case of Bush v. Gore ...........................  568 
 III. REAL DEMOCRACY: BUSH V. GORE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT .................  578 
  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................  584 
 
 Imagine, as you may already wish, that it is 2004. Despite flickers 
of opposition from Senator John McCain and former Nebraska 
Senator Robert Kerrey, George W. Bush and Al Gore appear to have 
sown up their respective renominations by mid-spring. In some state 
with, say, twenty-five electors, the Democratic legislature and the 
Democratic governor are worried. Polls predict a razor-thin Gore vic-
tory in the state, but, if voting machines malfunction or if inclement 
weather depresses the senior citizen vote, the state could be lost to 
Bush. No one wants a repeat of Florida’s 2000 travails. The solution? 
The legislature enacts a bill, eagerly signed by the Governor, provid-
ing that the state legislature itself, by a majority vote of each house, 
shall choose the state’s electors in 2004 for President and Vice Presi-
dent of the United States. 
 Under Bush v. Gore,1 my hypothetical statute is constitutional. A 
state legislature’s authority to disenfranchise the entire citizenry is 
the very premise with which the majority in Bush v. Gore commences 
its legal analysis.2 But this premise is wrong. Its cavalier utterance 
by the majority exemplifies one of the opinion’s most extraordinary 
aspects, its obliviousness to the values of democracy. 
                                                                                                                    
 * Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Public Policy and Director of the In-
stitute for the Study of Information Technology and Society, H. John Heinz III School of 
Law and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University; Professor of Law, University of Pitts-
burgh School of Law. 
 I am grateful to Professor Bernard Hibbitts of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
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Presidential Election Law within the Jurist web site, see http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/elec-
tion2000.htm, that proved invaluable for real-time research and analysis regarding the 
2000 election. This Article benefitted also from comments by Professor Greg Magarian of 
Villanova Law School and attorneys Reed Hundt and Carolyn Shapiro, as well as from the 
research assistance of Michael Vasiliadis, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Class of 
2002. Copyright 2001. Peter M. Shane. All rights reserved. 
 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 104. 
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 On any account, Bush v. Gore marked an astonishing event in the 
history of democratic governance. Never before in the history of de-
mocratic government has an unelected judicial organ chosen the 
head of state by preventing the counting of votes. Such an event cuts 
entirely against the grain of our political history. The past 200 years 
have witnessed a broadening of the franchise in the United States 
(and throughout the world) in terms of both eligibility and applicabil-
ity. The right to vote has become central to our conception of citizen-
ship. It is hard to imagine any modern-day Western theory of gov-
ernmental legitimacy that does not rest in some essential aspect on 
“the electoral connection.” Thus, it was startling to witness the Su-
preme Court’s incautious embrace of a theory of the world’s most im-
portant elected office that treats its democratic character as merely 
discretionary. 
 Bush v. Gore is antidemocratic in more than its ordination of a 
particular electoral outcome. It is oblivious to the democratic charac-
ter of our Constitution in every aspect of its analysis. Its very start-
ing point—the asserted authority of the states to disenfranchise vot-
ers altogether from participation in the selection of presidential elec-
tors—is unpersuasive in the face of the text and history of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and Part I below explains why the Constitution 
ought now be interpreted to protect the rights of individuals to vote 
for state electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States. This analysis points to what should have been the founda-
tional premise of Bush v. Gore: namely, the conspicuous trajectory of 
our constitutional development toward more democracy. And, it ex-
plains why the Florida Legislature would have been acting unconsti-
tutionally in December 2000 had it proceeded to authorize its own 
slate of electors in lieu of those chosen on Election Day. 
 Part II explores how the Fourteenth Amendment should have 
been deployed in light of democratic values to resolve the questions 
actually presented by Bush v. Gore. The majority purported to ad-
dress an equal protection problem in Bush v. Gore, although none of 
the practices being challenged amounted, under anyone’s account, to 
a form of explicit or otherwise intentional discrimination against 
Bush voters—the sort of harm typically addressed through an equal 
protection rubric.3 By contrast, the importance of procedural due 
process in elections as an essential bulwark of democracy was utterly 
overlooked. Vote tabulation is a species of administrative adjudica-
tion, and voters should be deemed minimally entitled under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to voting tabulation systems rationally cal-
culated to ascertain their intent accurately. A due process analysis of 
the Florida election supports the conclusion that hand recounts in 
                                                                                                                    
 3. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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challenged counties should have been deemed a constitutional pre-
requisite to the casting of Florida’s electoral votes. There was no le-
gal or practical impediment to conducting a statewide recount consis-
tent with the Fourteenth Amendment, and, compared to the Court’s 
assault on due process, the equal protection issue raised by the ma-
jority and accepted as nontrivial by Justices Souter and Breyer4 pales 
as insubstantial. 
 Part III considers whether the issues presented in Bush v. Gore 
should have been considered political questions. The most compelling 
demand of democratic principle in Bush v. Gore may well have been 
that the Court defer to Congress, as an elected federal institution, for 
the resolution of a wholly political contest. Both the textual and the 
institutional arguments for deferring to Congress would have been 
stronger in Bush v. Gore than they were in Nixon v. United States.5 
In that earlier case, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and 
for Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, O’ Connor and Thomas, held it 
to be a political question whether the Senate was constitutionally re-
quired to hold a full evidentiary hearing before the entire Senate in 
order to convict and remove an impeached judge.6 The abandonment 
by the Bush v. Gore majority of this jurisprudential commitment, as 
well as others, helped to create the distressing impression that five 
Justices were determined to ordain a Bush victory, regardless of the 
legal merits. It is a measure of the Court’s imprudence in deciding 
Bush v. Gore both that such a possibility cannot be dismissed out of 
hand and that the Court could have responsibly deferred to Congress 
as the more accountable and constitutionally appropriate deci-
sionmaking institution to resolve the Florida controversy. 
I.   THE FEDERAL RIGHT TO VOTE FOR PRESIDENT 
 Bush v. Gore commences its legal analysis by addressing a prob-
lem not actually at issue in the case: “The individual citizen has no 
federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of 
the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a 
statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint 
members of the Electoral College.”7 This is an odd starting place be-
cause, of course, there was no question in Bush v. Gore regarding 
Floridians’ entitlement to vote. One would have thought the more 
important premise would have been the fundamental status of the 
right to vote once conferred by state law, a legal proposition that the 
Court recognizes just a few sentences later: “When the state legisla-
                                                                                                                    
 4. 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 5. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 6. Id. at 226.  
 7. 531 U.S. at 104. 
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ture vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to 
vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source 
of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each 
vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”8 From this utterance, 
it sounds as if the Court is prepared to focus on democracy after all. 
But the rhetorical mood reverts immediately to reemphasize the con-
tingent character of national democracy. The Court stresses in its 
very next sentence: “The State, of course, after granting the franchise 
in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint 
electors.”9 The Court thus founds its analysis on the presumptive 
right of legislators to exclude citizens from presidential elections. 
 Why start the opinion this way? In retrospect, the gambit looks 
obvious. The majority is about to apply the Equal Protection Clause 
in a way that will disenfranchise thousands of Florida voters. The 
majority anticipates that such may be the case.10 Yet, the majority is 
prepared to treat another issue as more important, namely, what the 
majority takes to be a threatened procedural error in the addition of 
hand-counted votes to Florida’s machine-tallied county vote totals. 
The suggestion implicit in the opening paragraph, foreshadowing the 
end game to come, is that any disenfranchisement that the Court in-
flicts should not be perceived as a harm more serious than the proce-
dural infirmity that the Court is prepared to remedy. That is, the 
majority wants the country to believe that any improper diminish-
ment of a ballot actually counted by Florida’s voting machines 
amounts to a more serious harm than the wholesale rejection of valid 
ballots that the voting machines have failed to register. Why? Be-
cause “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to 
vote for electors for the President of the United States.”11 The Court’s 
implicit stance is that voters whose votes are counted but improperly 
weighted lose something that the Constitution protects, but that dis-
enfranchised voters do not. There is no other sensible reason for 
starting where the Court starts.12 
 But this message is wrong. It is wrong, in part, because it could 
not possibly be the case in law or in reality that a voter whose ballot 
                                                                                                                    
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (“This case has shown that punchcard balloting machines can produce an un-
fortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the voter.”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Actually, if one were yet more cynical about the majority than even I, there would 
be yet another explanation. The reiteration that state legislatures cannot only disenfran-
chise the electorate ex ante from the selection of presidential electors but may also take 
back the franchise once granted could be read as a message to the Florida Legislature: “If 
Gore does not concede following this opinion, you have the right to intervene.” For reasons 
described in the text below, I believe this message, if intended, would be wrong as to the 
Constitution. Its utterance would also embody so profound a corruption of the judicial role 
that I would prefer to think that the Court did not intend such a message. 
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is marginally devalued is worse off than a voter whose ballot is ut-
terly discarded. Even more fundamentally, it is wrong because the 
Fourteenth Amendment, persuasively read, does guarantee individ-
ual citizens the right to vote for presidential electors. 
 The straightforward argument for this position begins with Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: 
 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when 
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the 
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for par-
ticipation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State.13 
It is the italicized reference to “the choice of electors for President 
and Vice President of the United States” that most obviously ratifies 
this process as one in which individual citizens must be allowed to 
participate. 
 Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted with a 
transparent aim. With the abolition of slavery, each African 
American living in a formerly Confederate state would now count as 
five-fifths and not merely three-fifths of a person for purposes of con-
gressional apportionment.14 Congress was not yet ready in 1866 to 
approve a constitutional amendment guaranteeing suffrage regard-
less of race. But neither did the Republicans in control of Congress 
want to award the Confederate states an enlarged population, and 
thus additional seats in the House,15 if the constituency most likely to 
support the Republicans—namely, newly freed African Americans—
were not going to be allowed to vote. Black suffrage, at least in the-
ory, was to be the price of an enlarged congressional delegation. 
 The original wording of Section 2, as reported to the House of 
Representatives by the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruc-
tion, had actually been significantly different in a critical respect: 
                                                                                                                    
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 14. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 15. The enlargement of any state’s House delegation would also increase its number 
of votes in the Electoral College. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (each state shall have “a Number 
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State 
may be entitled in the Congress”). 
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 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union according to their respec-
tive numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever in any State the elec-
tive franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not 
less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of represen-
tation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the 
number of male citizens shall bear to the whole number of such 
male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.16 
The important difference in this version, as compared to the 
Amendment as finally transmitted by Congress, is that the second 
sentence of the original version did not specify the elections to which 
it would apply. That is, this version would have reduced a state’s 
right of representation proportionally if, in any election, the state 
disenfranchised any portion of its male citizenry, twenty-one years of 
age or older, for reasons other than “participation in rebellion or 
other crime.” The House approved this version of the Amendment on 
May 10, 1866.17 
 In the Senate, however, the question was raised whether the 
scope of the second sentence was too great. Senator Henderson of 
Missouri raised the issue: 
 Now, we have in our State an election for school directors, a gen-
eral election held in every municipal township throughout the 
State of Missouri, at a certain time. At that election there are 
qualifications prescribed that we deem absolutely essential to keep 
up the common-school system in our State. For instance, property 
holders only vote for school directors. . . . There is an election also 
for school trustees. Those trustees are elected by the persons who 
have children to send to school. Now, if it be intended to exclude 
all persons who cannot vote at those elections from the basis of 
representation, I apprehend that not only will the negroes of my 
State be excluded under the proposed amendment, which will lose 
us a member in Congress, but it will exclude two thirds of the 
whites of the State of Missouri. I desire to know whether any such 
construction can be given to this proposition.18 
There followed a brief colloquy in which there was agreement that 
the amendment would not cover school directors and trustees, but 
during which sponsors suggested that the language would cover 
“municipal officers.”19 Henderson suggested rewriting the disputed 
                                                                                                                    
 16. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens). 
 17. Id. at 2545. 
 18. Id. at 3010 (remarks of Sen. Henderson). 
 19. Id. (remarks of Sens. Fessenden and Henderson). 
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sentence to cover elections only for “Governor, judges, or members of 
either branch of the Legislature.”20  
 Senator Fessenden objected immediately that this would not cover 
elections for the House of Representatives.21 Senator Henderson re-
sponded that it would. The Constitution provides that “the Electors 
in each State [for the House of Representatives] shall have the Quali-
fications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the 
State Legislature.”22 Hence, Senator Henderson reasoned, regulating 
state electoral qualifications for the state legislature would necessar-
ily have the desired impact on House of Representatives elections, as 
well. Anything more than that, according to Senator Henderson, 
should be beyond the purview of the new amendment. According to 
Henderson: 
The only election that can be held under the Constitution and laws 
of the United States is for members of Congress. Electors [for 
President and Vice President], as now provided by the Constitution, 
are to be elected by the State in any manner it chooses. . . . [U]nless 
you alter the Constitution on the subject the State Legislatures 
will yet have the power to regulate that matter entirely as they 
please, and this amendment will not change it at all. There is, 
therefore, but one election that can be held under the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States, and that is the election of mem-
bers of the lower branch of Congress, because Senators are elected 
by the legislatures.23 
Because Senator Howard of Michigan then raised questions, how-
ever, regarding the precise impact of the proposed Henderson 
amendment, the Senate was adjourned for the day so that Henderson 
and Howard might work out their differences.24 
 The next morning, Senator Williams of Oregon proposed that Sec-
tion 2 be amended to apply to elections “held under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, or of any State.”25 Objection was made 
immediately that this formulation was yet more confusing. Senator 
Johnson of Maryland suggested as an alternative: 
[T]hat the phraseology of this amendment, if it is to prevail, shall 
be so changed as to leave it beyond doubt that all that is meant is 
to except out of the whole number of inhabitants of the age of 
twenty-one years or upward, who are citizens of the State, those 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Id. at 3011 (remarks of Sen. Henderson). 
 21. Id. (remarks of Sen. Fessenden). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 23. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3011 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Henderson) (em-
phasis added). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3026 (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
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who are denied the right to vote at any State election, as contra-
distinguished from any municipal or local election.26 
He then proceeded to attack Section 2 for a variety of allegedly per-
verse results he believed would follow from its application.27 
 Senator Williams interrupted, however, to concede only the point 
that Section 2 should specify with complete precision the elections 
that the amendment was intended to cover. He replaced the sug-
gested phrase from the first version of his amendment to Section 2—
“election held under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
or of any State”—with the phrase: “any election for the choice of elec-
tors for President and Vice President of the United States, Represen-
tatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or 
members of the Legislature thereof.”28 The Senate subsequently 
adopted this language,29 which was accepted also by the House.30 
 The substitution offered by Senator Williams and ultimately rati-
fied as part of the Fourteenth Amendment embodied a critically im-
portant move, and it is intriguing that the point elicited no further 
discussion on the floor of either the Senate or the House. It must be 
recalled that, as Senator Henderson had expressly noted, the original 
Constitution provided three separate modes for the election of federal 
officials. The House of Representatives was to be chosen by “Electors 
in each State [who] shall have the Qualifications requisite for Elec-
tors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”31 In con-
trast, the Senate would be composed of “two Senators from each 
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.”32 The President and Vice 
President would be chosen by electors that “[e]ach State shall ap-
point, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”33 As 
Senator Henderson insisted, only one of these electoral processes 
guaranteed some form of franchise directly to individual citizens of 
the several states, namely, elections for the House. A popular fran-
chise was precluded altogether by the constitutional provisions re-
garding the Senate and permitted, but not required, with regard to 
the selection of presidential electors. And yet, in translating his 
original formulation, “election[s] held under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States,”34 into a more specific articulation, Senator 
Williams included among the elections covered by Section 2 “any 
                                                                                                                    
 26. Id. at 3027 (remarks of Sen. Johnson). 
 27. Id. at 3026-29 (remarks of Sen. Johnson). 
 28. Id. at 3029 (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
 29. Id. at 3040. 
 30. Id. at 3149. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 32. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  
 33. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 34. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3029 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Williams).  
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election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of 
the United States, [or] Representatives in Congress.”35 The issue is 
how to interpret this translation. 
 If what counts in interpreting text are subjective states of mind, 
then, of course, we cannot know with certainty either Senator Wil-
liams’s thought processes or those of the legislators who had the 
chance to review his handiwork. One possibility is that Senator Wil-
liams did not intend Section 2 as implying state compulsion to hold 
any particular elections. Section 2, that is, may provide only a lim-
ited rule of nondiscrimination in elections that are guaranteed by 
some law other than Section 2 itself, whether that law is another 
federal constitutional provision or, in most cases, a state law. On this 
hypothesis, he included elections for presidential and vice-
presidential electors only to recognize that many such elections are 
held under laws of the respective states, and, to the extent they are 
held, he wanted them held, among men at least, on a racially nondis-
criminatory basis. 
 The strongest argument in support of this reading is that Section 
2 applies to “any election for . . . Judicial officers of a State”36 but has 
not been interpreted to require state judicial elections. This might be 
read likewise to leave elections in connection with the choice of 
presidential electors optional. The reason would be that, if the refer-
ence to “any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President”37 compelled the use of some popular vote, then referring to 
“any election for . . . Judicial officers of a State”38 would have to com-
pel the use of a popular vote to choose judges, as well. Both clauses, 
to this extent, ought to be read in the same way. 
 This argument, however, is hardly conclusive. It might make per-
fect sense on federalism grounds to read Section 2 as embodying a 
background guarantee that the federal offices to which it refers are 
mandatorily subject to popular votes, while selection systems for the 
state offices to which it refers remain discretionary with the states. 
 Indeed, a devastating problem for the more limited interpretation 
regarding presidential elections is that, if the use of the popular vote 
in presidential elections remains discretionary under Section 2, then 
it would be easy for state legislatures to undermine the Republicans’ 
aim of making black suffrage the price of reempowering the Southern 
states. Imagine that Section 2 is read to cover House elections but 
not to require popular votes for presidential electors. Imagine further 
that a Southern state subsequently enfranchised all propertied male 
                                                                                                                    
 35. Id.  
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
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adult citizens in House elections but barred black men from voting 
for President. The consequence of allowing all men to vote for House 
seats would likely be an enlarged congressional delegation for the 
state in question because the entirety of the state’s black population 
would now be counted as part of its proper apportionment base. The 
enlarged House delegation would necessarily increase the size of the 
state’s presidential elector delegation because the number of a state’s 
electors is equal to the total of its senatorial delegation (always two) 
and its House delegation. Disenfranchising black voters in such a 
state from presidential elections would defeat the objectives of con-
gressional Republicans because white voters in this hypothetical 
Southern state would then have managed to achieve a larger voice in 
the Electoral College without permitting blacks to vote for President. 
This would subvert a significant portion of what Section 2 was in-
tended to achieve. 
 So long as we interpret the Constitution as making popular in-
volvement in presidential elections no more than a state legislative 
prerogative, Section 2 cannot prevent white Southerners from doing 
just this very thing. Senator Henderson made precisely this point 
with regard to an earlier formulation of Section 2.39 All that need 
happen in a Southern state intent on maintaining white control of 
presidential elector appointments is for the majority-white legisla-
ture to institute or maintain a practice of having itself select slates of 
presidential electors without any popular vote involvement. In other 
words, Section 2 can effectively impose black suffrage as the price of 
increased Southern strength in the Electoral College only if each 
state is required to include a popular vote mechanism in the process 
of choosing its presidential electors. Thus, whatever his subjective in-
tentions, Senator Williams’s textual revision makes purposive sense 
only if the Constitution, as altered by the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
deemed to signal a background understanding that individual citi-
zens in the several states would now be guaranteed some form of 
franchise in presidential elections, as well as in House contests.40 
                                                                                                                    
 39. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3011 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Henderson). 
 40. My argument thus does not rest on the supposition that, because of their denota-
tional meaning and Section 2’s syntax alone, the words of Section 2 must be interpreted as 
commanding popular involvement in presidential elections. It is rather the purpose behind 
the inclusion of those words that commands popular involvement in presidential elections 
just as, say, it is Article I, Section 2 that provides the requirement that a popular vote be 
staged in order to select members of the House of Representatives. On the same basis, 
unless there is something in the Federal Constitution other than the syntax of Section 2 
that compels state judicial elections, then the mere linguistic reference to state judicial 
elections in Section 2 would not be enough to deprive states of discretion to prefer ap-
pointed judiciaries. That “something” would have to be either another clause in the Consti-
tution or a demonstration that eliminating appointed state judiciaries is implicit in the 
history or design of Section 2. 
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 For these reasons, one need not look further than Section 2 for a 
constitutional guarantee that individual citizens of the several states 
shall be entitled to participate in the selection of presidential elec-
tors. The near-complete consistency of post-Fourteenth Amendment 
state practice with this reading also validates it.41 On only two occa-
sions since ratification has a state legislature taken upon itself the 
authority to appoint an entire slate of presidential electors. Florida 
did so in 1868, presumably because the process was already in place 
prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment on July 21, 
1868.42 Colorado’s legislature did the same in 1876, apparently be-
cause the grant of statehood that year was deemed to leave too little 
                                                                                                                    
 41. On the far more frequent appointment of presidential electors by state legisla-
tures prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29-33 
(1892): 
 At the first presidential election the appointment of electors was made by the 
legislatures of Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, and South Caro-
lina . . . . 
 Fifteen States participated in the second presidential election, in nine of 
which electors were chosen by the legislatures . . . .  
 Sixteen States took part in the third presidential election, Tennessee having 
been admitted June 1, 1796. In nine States the electors were appointed by the 
legislatures . . . . 
 In the fourth presidential election, Virginia, under the advice of Mr. Jeffer-
son, adopted the general ticket, at least ‘until some uniform mode of choosing a 
President and Vice-President of the United States shall be prescribed by an 
amendment to the Constitution.’ Laws Va. 1799, 1800, p. 3. Massachusetts 
passed a resolution providing that the electors of that State should be ap-
pointed by joint ballot of the senate and house. . . . Pennsylvania appointed by 
the legislature, and upon a contest between the senate and house, the latter 
was forced to yield to the senate in agreeing to an arrangement which resulted 
in dividing the vote of the electors. 26 Niles’ Reg. 17 . . . . 
 . . . Massachusetts . . . chose electors by joint ballot of the legislature in 1808 
and in 1816. . . . The appointment of electors by the legislature, instead of by 
popular vote, was made use of by North Carolina, Vermont, and New Jersey in 
1812. 
 In 1824 the electors were chosen by popular vote, by districts, and by general 
ticket, in all the States excepting Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, 
South Carolina, and Vermont, where they were still chosen by the legislature. 
After 1832 electors were chosen by general ticket in all the States excepting 
South Carolina, where the legislature chose them up to and including 1860. . . . 
And this was the mode adopted by Florida in 1868, (Laws 1868, p. 166) and by 
Colorado in 1876, as prescribed by § 19 of the schedule to the constitution of the 
State, which was admitted into the Union, August 1, 1876, Gen. Laws Colo. 
1877, pp. 79, 990. 
McPherson upheld a challenge to Michigan’s appointment of presidential electors based on 
the popular vote in each congressional district. Although language in the case is strongly 
supportive of the legislature’s plenary power to employ any mode of appointment what-
ever, McPherson, 146 U.S. at 10, the case simply did not present the question I am discuss-
ing here. The Michigan legislature had not purported to appoint presidential electors 
through a process independent of a popular vote. 
 42. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1440 (6th. ed. 
2000). 
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time to put a popular vote for electors into place.43 As Justice Frank-
furter wrote in another legal context:  
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government can-
not supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning 
to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow 
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the 
words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has 
written upon them.44 
Popular votes for presidential electors are a “deeply embedded tradi-
tional way” of conducting presidential elections, and this history 
should be decisive in resolving any ambiguity in Section 2. 
 There is, however, yet another route to recognizing a Fourteenth 
Amendment right for voters to participate in the selection of presi-
dential electors. It would start with accepting as a premise that Sec-
tion 2 has only the more limited meaning suggested above, namely, 
that Section 2 embodies a limited nondiscrimination rule in certain 
categories of elections, so long as the popular franchise in such elec-
tions is guaranteed by some law other than Section 2 itself. In the 
case of presidential electors, it is possible to infer such a guarantee 
outside Section 2—specifically, from the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in Section 1. That clause provides: “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”45 Prospects for establishing a robust 
jurisprudence of individual rights based on “privileges or immuni-
ties” were shattered by the Court’s 5-4 decision in the 1872 Slaugh-
terhouse Cases.46 That decision rejected a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge by New Orleans butchers to a monopoly granted by the 
Louisiana Legislature to the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and 
Slaughter-House Company to operate a slaughterhouse in New Or-
leans. The butchers based their challenge on a variety of grounds, in-
cluding protections assertedly embodied in the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause against arbitrary laws in violation of inalienable funda-
mental rights.47 The majority rejected this analysis. According to the 
majority, the “privileges or immunities” to which the Fourteenth 
Amendment referred were exclusively “privileges or immunities” of 
national, rather than state citizenship. These, the Court said, em-
                                                                                                                    
 43. Colorado was admitted to the Union on August 1, 1876. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 9-
10. 
 44. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring). 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 46. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 47. Id. at 66. 
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braced only those rights that owed “their existence to the Federal 
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.”48 
 However meager this interpretation of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, it is still sufficient to ground an individual right to par-
ticipate in the selection of presidential electors.49 Although chosen 
through processes that states design and administer, presidential 
electors hold a federal office that is rooted entirely in the national 
Constitution. This point was not lost in the Fourteenth Amendment 
debates. During floor discussion immediately prior to the House 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Bingham 
stated, without contradiction: “The franchise of a Federal elective of-
fice is as clearly one of the privileges of a citizen of the United States 
as is the elective franchise for choosing Representatives in Congress 
or presidential electors. They are both provided for and guaranteed 
in your Constitution.”50 It is thus entirely sensible, especially in light 
of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to interpret the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause also as embracing a right of individual 
citizens to participate in the choice of presidential electors.51 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Id. at 79. 
 49. In urging this interpretation, I am plainly giving little or no weight to Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), which considered whether the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment conferred a right of state suffrage upon women. In 
reaching its negative conclusion to this inquiry, the Court held that neither the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, nor any other clause of the Constitution, creates voters per se. 
 Hapersett is of little consequence, however, to modern voting rights questions. Despite 
the Court’s repeated insistence that the Constitution does not vest suffrage directly, the 
Court has also characterized the right to vote as “fundamental.” E.g., Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). It is on that basis that the Court has further 
held that classifications limiting the franchise must be subject to a “close and exacting ex-
amination.” Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). The conse-
quences of requiring such an examination are generally indistinguishable from what would 
be the consequences of holding that the Constitution does directly confer suffrage rights, 
which, in turn, may not be subjected to unreasonable burdens. 
 In other words, it would hardly matter if the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not 
directly vest rights in anyone to help choose presidential electors, so long as the clause is 
read to bar a state legislature from excluding the entire citizenry from any elector selection 
process that the legislature decides to authorize. It would be sensible to conclude, that is: 
(1) that the “privileges or immunities” of citizenship include freedom from arbitrary limita-
tions on those whom the state, at its discretion, enfranchises to choose presidential elec-
tors, and (2) that any classification that eliminates from the process all members of the 
electorate who are not also state legislators is constitutionally impermissible. Those more 
respectful than I of Happersett might prefer to attach such conclusions to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Of course, such a result 
would be equally congenial to the democratic values of our present-day Constitution. 
 50. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
 51. It may be questioned whether the history of the Fifteenth Amendment casts doubt 
on my reading of the Fourteenth. That is because, in deliberations leading to the latter 
amendment, the Senate initially approved an additional constitutional reform that would 
have expressly required that presidential electors in each state be chosen by a popular vote 
in which the franchise would extend to all those qualified in the respective states to vote 
for members of the House of Representatives. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1042 
(1869). At first blush, it might seem implausible that such a proposal would have surfaced 
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 There is, of course, a perhaps even more compelling reason to read 
the Fourteenth Amendment as supportive of democracy: namely, the 
plain democratic trajectory of constitutional development since 1868. 
Since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have added 
thirteen other amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Six of these 
were specifically intended to further our constitutional commitment 
to the democratic process: extending the vote to persons of all races,52 
providing for the direct election of Senators,53 extending the franchise 
to women,54 permitting District of Columbia voters to choose elec-
tors,55 eliminating federal poll taxes,56 and lowering the voting age to 
                                                                                                                    
in 1869 if the Fourteenth Amendment had already required that state legislatures incorpo-
rate a popular vote mechanism into the selection of presidential electors. 
 In fact, however, my reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have made this 
additional proposal superfluous. The 1869 proposal would have gone beyond the Four-
teenth Amendment in constraining the role of state legislatures in the appointment of 
presidential electors. It would have eliminated that role altogether. This move would have 
left to Congress the decision whether to provide winner-take-all systems in every state or 
to permit electors to be chosen by congressional district. So marked a diminution in state 
authority might itself have been a sufficient reason to support or oppose the proposal, re-
gardless of what the Fourteenth Amendment had already accomplished. So democratizing 
a move was consistent with the breadth of radical Republican proposals for the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which envisioned an end not only to racial restrictions on the franchise but 
also an end to restrictions based on property holding, taxpayer status, nativity, and liter-
acy. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 95 (2000) (discussing proposals by Representative 
Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio and Senator (later Vice President) Henry Wilson of Massa-
chusetts). The fact of the 1869 proposal, therefore, casts little light on what its supporters 
or opponents understood to be the proper interpretation of either the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause or Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Of course, even if we assume that its drafters would not have consciously anticipated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment created an individual right of participation in choosing 
presidential electors, that is hardly conclusive as to the most compelling reading of the 
text. The inference now of such a right would follow a well-established jurisprudence that 
extends the Fourteenth Amendment to applications unanticipated in 1868. Prominent ex-
amples include Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating the gov-
ernment-imposed racial segregation of public schools), and Kramer, 395 U.S. 621 (invali-
dating restriction of school district franchise to voters who were parents of children en-
rolled in district’s schools or otherwise owners or lessors of taxable property). Especially 
because so little discussion occurred to illuminate the drafters’ subjective intentions, inter-
pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to presidential elections should rest 
on the most plausible implications of its wording and not on the subjective expectations of 
the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress. And, as compared to the innovative equal pro-
tection cases of the past half century, a decision to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as 
assuring the right to vote in presidential elections would rest on textual clues more specific 
and, to that limited extent, more compelling than the text available to guide a number of 
such earlier cases. See, for example, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663 (1966), which managed to invalidate state poll taxes under the Constitution despite a 
constitutional amendment just two years earlier that had eliminated the poll tax explicitly 
only with regard to federal elections. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 53. Id. amend. XVII. 
 54. Id. amend. XIX. 
 55. Id. amend. XXIII. 
 56. Id. amend. XXIV. I am grateful to attorney Vasan Kesavan for pointing out to me 
that the wording of the Twenty-fourth Amendment would seem especially odd if the Con-
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eighteen.57 It is unthinkable, against this history of constitutional 
development, that a state legislature should still be deemed author-
ized to usurp the people’s role in choosing presidential electors. 
 What difference does this make? Had the Supreme Court not de-
cided Bush v. Gore, the Florida Legislature stood poised to test these 
very principles. On December 12, 2000, the Florida House of Repre-
sentatives named a slate of twenty-five electors for candidate Bush, 
anticipating that judicial processes for certifying the state’s presiden-
tial vote might extend beyond December 18, the date for federal elec-
toral balloting.58 The Florida Senate abandoned the measure only af-
ter Gore conceded the election in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision, thus averting the possibility of constitutional crisis.59 But 
this near-miss clearly highlights the legal question: What should 
have been the result had the legislature gone ahead with its slate 
and Florida Gore voters sought to enjoin balloting by a legislatively 
chosen set of electors? 
 Such a move would plainly have deprived the voters of Florida of 
their Fourteenth Amendment right to participate in the selection of 
presidential electors. As of the time of the Florida House vote, pro-
ceedings in the Florida courts had every prospect of reaching a timely 
conclusion. Federal law provides: “Whenever any State has held an 
election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a 
choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on 
a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State 
may direct.”60 As of December 12, however, it had not been estab-
lished that the people of Florida had “failed to make a choice on the 
day prescribed by law.” Moreover, any legislative authority to direct 
the appointment of electors on a day subsequent to Election Day 
would still have to be exercised in a manner consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment requirement for including a process of popu-
lar voting in the selection of presidential voters.61 Giving the Four-
                                                                                                                    
stitution does not require state legislatures to include a popular vote mechanism in the 
section of electors. 
 57. Id. amend. XXVI. 
 58. Marego Athans, Florida House OKs Bush Elector Slate—Measure is Passed Along 
Party Lines 79-41, After 5½ Hour Debate, BALT. SUN, Dec. 13, 2000, at 22A, available at 
2000 WL 4886822. 
 59. Florida Legislature Passes Up Naming Slate of Electors, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, 
Tenn.), Dec. 15, 2000, at A11, available at 2000 WL 27945697. 
 60. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
 61. It would additionally have been offensive to the Constitution to undo Florida’s le-
gally authorized November 7 balloting retroactively. As the Bush brief argued in the Su-
preme Court (in a far less persuasive context): “[C]onstitutional principles of due process 
and fundamental fairness preclude the States from adopting ‘a post-election departure 
from previous practice’ and applying that post-election rule retroactively to determine the 
outcome of an election.” Brief For Petitioner at 28, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836) (citing Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 581 (11th Cir. 
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teenth Amendment its most compelling reading would have rendered 
Florida’s attempted legislative appointment of electors unconstitu-
tional. 
 But a proper reading of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard 
to the popular franchise in presidential elections should have been 
influential in Bush v. Gore itself. As noted earlier, the question 
whether Floridians were constitutionally entitled to participate in 
the appointment of presidential electors was technically not an issue 
presented in this case.62 Imagine, however, that the majority’s legal 
analysis had started as follows: “The Fourteenth Amendment has 
granted Americans, as individual citizens, a federal constitutional 
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States.” It is 
implausible that a decision so starting could have ended with the ju-
dicially compelled disenfranchisement of thousands of Florida voters. 
This constitutional premise, diametrically opposed to the Court’s ac-
tual starting point, would have required that every ambiguity be re-
solved and every presumption indulged in favor of a comprehensive 
count of all Florida ballots. Thus, it is hardly a surprise that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court’s first opinion in this episode begins with that 
state’s fundamental legal commitments to the right to vote and to a 
determination of electoral outcomes that reflects “the will of the peo-
ple.”63 It is shameful that the Supreme Court of the United States 
spurned those commitments. 
II.   BUSH V. GORE AND VOTE TABULATION AS MASS ADJUDICATION 
A.   Equal Protection and Due Process in Bush v. Gore 
 The issue that the Court did have to face in Bush v. Gore was the 
consistency with federal law of the manual recount of Florida ballots 
that had been ordered by the Florida Supreme Court in response to 
Gore’s contest of the certification of Bush electors. Five Justices held 
that “[t]he recount mechanisms implemented in response to the deci-
sions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum re-
                                                                                                                    
1995)), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/briefforpetitioner.pdf. Nothing in Flor-
ida’s law made the November 7 election merely advisory to the state legislature. 
 Second, in purporting to adjudicate the actual outcome of the November 7 election, the 
Florida Legislature would have been grabbing judicial authority in violation of due process. 
It was state legislative usurpation of judicial power during the 1780s that motivated the 
Philadelphia drafters to provide the nation with an independent federal judiciary and to 
oust Congress from adjudication except with regard to impeachment and judging the quali-
fications and conduct of its own members. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961-962 (1983) 
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Now that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes 
due process obligations upon the states, state legislatures should be deemed to have identi-
cal limits on their capacity to assert adjudicatory power. 
 62. See supra text accompanying note 7.  
 63. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2000), 
rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Palm County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
2001]                         DISAPPEARING DEMOCRACY 551 
 
quirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure 
the fundamental right [to equal protection].”64 Although the majority 
suggested a variety of respects in which the recount mechanisms fell 
short of constitutional requirements, the essential infirmity of the 
ordered recount was ostensibly the absence of a uniform standard to 
be followed in each county for the discernment of voter intent. Be-
cause, based on this infirmity, “it [was] evident that any recount 
seeking to meet [a] December 12 [deadline] will be unconstitutional,” 
the Court “reverse[d] the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida 
ordering a recount to proceed.”65 
 I think the Court’s analysis was wrong on its own terms—its re-
medial holding is especially indefensible. But one of the more unfor-
tunate aspects of the opinion is not just that it is wrong, but that it 
focuses on the wrong, or at least the less compelling, thing—equal 
protection—rather than due process.66 This may seem an odd com-
plaint. I do not mean to suggest that, if the majority had simply de-
cided Bush v. Gore under the “right” clause, five Justices would have 
come out the right way. As a rhetorical matter, however, the focus on 
equal protection rather than due process tends to obscure the real is-
                                                                                                                    
 64. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000). Justice Souter, while dissenting from the 
Court’s remedial order (and, indeed, from its grant of review), agreed that “no legitimate 
state interest” justified the imposition of different standards in different counties for 
measuring voter intent. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer took a more nu-
anced position. He implied that the availability in Florida of judicial review to examine 
disputed ballots would, in ordinary times, suffice to permit recounts to proceed under an 
administrative standard no more specific than the general “intent of the voter” standard 
imposed by the Florida Supreme Court. Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Because “time 
was, and is, too short,” however, “to permit the lower courts to iron out significant differ-
ences through ordinary judicial review,” and because the Florida Supreme Court’s order 
had already included tabulations from counties employing different standards, Breyer 
agreed that, “in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness should have 
counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem.” Id. at 145-46. “In 
light of the majority’s disposition” of the case, Breyer did not discuss “whether, or the ex-
tent to which, as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place limits upon the content 
of the uniform standard.” Id. at 146. 
 65. Id. at 110. 
 66. The per curiam opinion is actually somewhat careless in identifying the constitu-
tional clause on which it hangs its analysis. At the outset, the majority seems pointed in 
resting its conclusions on equal protection. It foreshadows its discussion as follows: “The 
petition presents the following questions: . . . whether the use of standardless manual re-
counts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. With respect to the equal 
protection question, we find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 103. This 
framing of the issues seems to leave due process out of the equation. Yet, after describing 
the alleged procedural defects of the judicially mandated recount, the Court simply tosses 
in, without any analysis, due process as an additional ground for its conclusion. “Upon due 
consideration of the difficulties identified to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot 
be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process 
without substantial additional work.” Id. at 110. Because the reference to “the require-
ments of . . . due process” occurs without any specification of what they might be, I think it 
a fair statement that the majority gave no sustained thought to the Florida election from a 
due process standpoint. 
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sues confronting Florida in designing and implementing a fair vote 
tabulation system. 
 The Equal Protection Clause may seem at first the more natural 
lens through which to view an election contest. Equal protection chal-
lenges generally involve the differential treatment of persons, im-
plicit or explicit, because of groups to which they belong, for example, 
groups of Bush supporters or Gore supporters. Unlike typical equal 
protection cases, however, Bush v. Gore does not exhibit any obvious 
link between a challenged classification or criterion for treatment 
and any group’s systematic advantage or disadvantage.67 The major-
ity opinion identifies three sources of differentiation in the treatment 
of voters by different counties: differential standards for evaluating 
contested ballots,68 differences between recounts limited to under-
votes and recounts that reexamined all of the ballots cast,69 and dif-
ferences between tabulations based on partial recounts versus tabu-
lations based on completed recounts.70 Legally speaking, these may 
be phenomena worth noting, but it is hard to predict who will be hurt 
by them. There was no allegation that any amounted to an inten-
tionally invidious discriminatory practice—the kind of practice that 
the Court normally requires before it elevates the intensity of its 
constitutional scrutiny of state practices under the Equal Protection 
Clause.71 
 Due process, by contrast, focuses on the adequacies of a govern-
mental process for making adjudicatory decisions, whether formal or 
informal. Adjudicatory decisions are what vote tabulation, most obvi-
ously manual vote counting, is all about. That is, when an adminis-
trative body counts votes, it is discerning on the basis of a formal 
piece of evidence—a ballot—the intent of the voter regarding the out-
come of a political contest. Analytically, due process provides the 
more helpful framework for assessing the fairness of an adjudicatory 
system to all those affected by its outcomes. It also is directly suppor-
tive of the democratic principle. There would plainly be little signifi-
cance to the practice of voting if voters were not assured rational 
treatment in the counting of their votes. 
                                                                                                                    
 67. Bush was clearly being hurt by the Florida recount only in the sense that, having 
been certified the statewide winner by 537 votes on November 26, see BUSH V. GORE: THE 
COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY xiii (E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001), he 
would clearly have been better off if he could have prevented any further counting at all, 
regardless of the procedures used. There is no obvious way in which the kinds of dispari-
ties mentioned by the Court could be said to favor Democrats or Republicans. From all the 
Court knew on December 12, Bush would have been threatened as much by the constitu-
tionally most exacting recount as he would by any other. 
 68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106-07. 
 69. Id. at 107. 
 70. Id. at 108-09. 
 71. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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 To make that assessment comprehensively, however, I would like 
to look at two cases: a hypothetical Gore v. Harris and the actual 
Bush v. Gore. The point of the first inquiry is both to establish the 
amenability of the Florida election to a sound due process analysis 
and to point out that, with regard to the issue of procedural fairness, 
the per curiam opinion again ignores the proper constitutional base-
line from which it should have judged the Bush challenges. That is, 
Bush v. Gore should have been resolved against a baseline under-
standing of Gore’s constitutional entitlement to a manual recount in 
four disputed counties. Even if the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no right on 
Florida voters to participate in the appointment of presidential elec-
tors, the voters were still entitled to an adjudication of voter intent 
consistent with due process. The Supreme Court effectively deprived 
them of that right. 
B.   Applying Due Process I: The Hypothetical Case of Gore v. Harris 
 To see the implications of due process from the position of Democ-
ratic voters, it is helpful to start a chapter or two back from the ac-
tual decision in Bush v. Gore and to consider how due process would 
have looked in the week after Election Day from the Gore perspec-
tive. To do so requires us to recall where matters stood legally about 
a month before the Supreme Court’s final decision. To make that rec-
ollection possible, a brief review of Florida law in effect at the time of 
the election72 is necessary. 
 In Florida, vote counting within each county was the initial re-
sponsibility of so-called election boards, which include inspectors and 
clerks for every precinct who are appointed to their positions by the 
Supervisors of Elections in each of the respective counties.73 The 
boards in each county were required to prepare certified tallies, 
which were delivered, in turn, to the Supervisor of Elections and to 
the county court judge.74 In addition, each Supervisor of Elections sat 
on a so-called county canvassing board, along with two other mem-
bers—the county court judge, who acted as chair of the canvassing 
board, and the chair of the board of county commissioners.75 It was 
the primary duty of each county canvassing board to canvass absen-
tee ballots, and then prepare a canvass of the entire election result 
within each county, “as shown by the returns . . . on file in the office 
of the supervisor of elections and the office of the county court 
                                                                                                                    
 72. The Florida Legislature passed wholesale amendments to its election procedures 
in the 2001 session. See Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, at 117-
73.  
 73. FLA. STAT. § 102.012 (2000) (amended 2001). 
 74. Id. § 102.071. 
 75. Id. § 102.141(1). 
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judge.”76 The county canvassing board was then charged with certify-
ing the county’s results to the Secretary of State, who was required 
ultimately to certify the results of any statewide election.77 
 Florida law vested county canvassing boards with essential re-
sponsibilities in the event of challenged elections. The relevant stat-
ute permitted “[a]ny candidate whose name appeared on the ballot” 
to file within seventy-two hours of an election “a written request with 
the county canvassing board for a manual recount.”78 It also permit-
ted “[a]ny candidate . . . to protest the returns of the election as being 
erroneous by filing with the appropriate canvassing board a sworn, 
written protest . . . prior to the time the canvassing board certifies 
the results for the office being protested or within 5 days” thereaf-
ter.79 
 The statute provided that a county canvassing board that had 
been asked for a manual recount “may” authorize such a process, 
provided that the “[t]he manual recount must include at least three 
precincts and at least 1 percent of the total votes cast for such candi-
date or issue.”80 Although Florida law specified no criteria for pro-
ceeding with such a preliminary manual recount, it did mandate a 
particular course of events should such a preliminary recount be di-
rected: 
 If the manual recount indicates an error in the vote tabulation 
which could affect the outcome of the election, the county canvass-
ing board shall: 
(a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with the 
vote tabulation system; 
(b) Request the Department of State to verify the tabulation soft-
ware; or 
(c) Manually recount all ballots.81 
In counties using paper ballots that cannot be read properly because 
of uncorrectable problems with the tabulation devices involved, only 
the third option—manually recounting all ballots—was available to 
fulfill what appears to be a statutory duty under this section. 
 Within forty-eight hours of election day, a machine recount re-
quired under Florida law for close elections narrowed Bush’s initial 
1784-vote lead to 327 votes.82 There was no mechanism available to 
Gore at that point to trigger a unified statewide recount. He could 
                                                                                                                    
 76. Id. § 102.141(2) (amended 2001). 
 77. Id. §§ 102.151, 102.155. 
 78. Id. § 102.166(4)(a) (amended 2001). 
 79. Id. § 102.166(1)(2) (amended 2001). 
 80. Id. § 102.166(4)(d) (amended 2001). 
 81. Id. § 102.166(5) (amended 2001). 
 82. BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at xi. 
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have sought manual recounts in every county in Florida, but his ad-
visers believed that such a strategy would be both chaotic and un-
necessary and might appear too impolitic—too much the desperate 
move of a sore loser.83 The decision was made on November 9 to pur-
sue recounts in only four heavily Democratic counties from which 
numerous complaints of irregularities had emerged—Broward, Mi-
ami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia. The Gore team hoped that re-
counts in these counties would suffice to overcome the tissue-thin 
Bush lead.84 
 By this time, it became equally clear that the Bush campaign and 
Republican election officials in Florida would try to prevent the out-
comes of hand recounts from affecting the certification of Florida’s 
statewide vote. In particular, Katherine Harris, Florida’s Secretary 
of State and co-chair of the Bush campaign in Florida, announced 
that she would not waive the apparent November 14 statutory dead-
line for the submission to her of county vote totals for certification.85 
On Saturday, November 11, the Bush campaign sought from the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida an injunction to 
block any hand recounts.86 
 I refer to November 14 as the “apparent” deadline because, as the 
Florida courts would soon discuss, Florida statutes were resolutely 
ambiguous on the issue of deadlines. On one hand, section 102.111, 
Florida Statutes, stated in seemingly unequivocal terms: “If the 
county returns are not received by the Department of State by 5 p.m. 
of the seventh day following an election, all missing counties shall be 
ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be certi-
fied.”87 This provision was echoed by section 102.112(1), Florida 
Statutes, which appeared to obligate county canvassing boards to 
submit county returns within seven days: 
 The county canvassing board or a majority thereof shall file the 
county returns for the election of a federal or state officer with the 
Department of State immediately after certification of the election 
results. Returns must be filed by 5 p.m. on the 7th day following 
the first primary and general election and by 3 p.m. on the 3rd day 
following the second primary.88 
These two provisions seemed to dictate that the 2000 county returns 
would have to be returned by November 14, the seventh day follow-
ing the general election. 
                                                                                                                    
 83. See Dave Von Drehle et al., In Florida, Drawing the Battle Lines: Big Guns As-
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 87. FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (amended 2001). 
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 That very same paragraph of section 102.112, however, stated 
equally explicitly that the decision whether or not to include in 
statewide totals any county returns that are submitted after the 
specified deadline was within the discretion of the Department of 
State: “If the [county] returns are not received by the department by 
the time specified, such returns may be ignored and the results on 
file at that time may be certified by the department.”89 The confusion 
was compounded in the next subsection, which provided: “The de-
partment shall fine each board member $200 for each day such re-
turns are late, the fine to be paid only from the board member’s per-
sonal funds.”90 Under this provision, it was plainly the policy of the 
Florida Legislature that county canvassing boards should be encour-
aged to submit even late returns as early as possible. This would be a 
puzzling concern if county returns even an hour or a day late were 
mandatorily to be ignored. 
 Notwithstanding Secretary Harris’s insistence on the November 
14 deadline, both Volusia and Palm Beach Counties readied to do the 
preliminary hand recounts authorized by section 102.166(4), Florida 
Statutes. Palm Beach County, home of the controversial butterfly 
ballot, presented the threshold question of how to discern voter in-
tent from a punch ballot that had not been read by the vote tabula-
tion machine. That is, how should a ballot be interpreted if the ballot, 
with regard to a particular office, did not exhibit a single unambigu-
ous hole from which the perforated rectangle—the now notorious 
“chad”—had been completely and successfully removed? On Saturday 
morning, November 11, the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 
(PBCCB) agreed on a “sunshine rule,” under which a vote would be 
tallied if the impression made on an imperfectly removed chad none-
theless allowed light to pass through the ballot in the proper place.91 
Based on that standard, at 2 a.m. on Sunday, November 12, the 
PBCCB voted two to one that a net gain for Gore of nineteen votes 
from a sample of four precincts warranted a complete manual re-
count of the entire county.92 
 Before proceeding further, County Judge Charles Burton, chair of 
the PBCCB, nonetheless wanted an official opinion from the Florida 
Department of State Division of Elections on two issues: First, he 
wanted to know if vote totals based on the recount were to be certi-
fied to the Secretary of State after Tuesday, November 14, at 5 
p.m.—whether they would be counted in the certification of statewide 
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results.93 Second, Burton wanted to know if the undercount for Gore 
detected by the preliminary manual recount over the weekend really 
triggered a mandatory recount under section 102.166(5) as a matter 
of law.94 That is, he wanted to know whether the apparent under-
counting of Gore votes amounted to what section 102.166 calls “an 
error in voting tabulation that could affect the outcome of an elec-
tion,” which would obligate the PBCCB to conduct a countywide hand 
recount.95 
 On Monday, November 13, L. Clayton Roberts, the director of the 
Division of Elections of the Florida Department of State, issued a 
negative response to both questions. Roberts noted the apparent dis-
crepancy between section 102.111, which seemed to make mandatory 
the exclusion from statewide totals of any county votes certified after 
the statutory deadline, and section 102.112, which seemed to render 
their inclusion or exclusion discretionary.96 He nonetheless deemed 
any discretion conferred by section 102.112 to be irrelevant to the 
problem presented. In his judgment, whatever discretion section 
102.112 allowed to the Department of State was intended only “[for] 
unforeseen circumstances not specifically contemplated by the legis-
lature. Such unforeseen circumstances might include a natural dis-
aster such [sic] Hurricane Andrew, where compliance with the law 
would be impossible. But a close election, regardless of the identity of 
the candidates, is not such a circumstance.”97 In a separate opinion, 
Roberts denied that an undercount would trigger a mandatory re-
count where the undercount was a result of “[t]he inability of a vot-
ing systems [sic] to read an improperly marked marksense or im-
properly punched ballot . . . .”98 Instead, “An ‘error in the vote tabula-
tion’ [that would trigger a mandatory recount] means a counting er-
ror in which the vote tabulation system fails to count properly 
marked marksense or properly punched punchcard ballots.”99 The 
obvious implications of these opinions were that the undercount for 
Gore that the PBCCB detected did not require a countywide recount 
and that such a recount might be pointless because it might not be 
possible to complete one before the statutory deadline of November 
                                                                                                                    
 93. 00-10 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec. (2000), reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES 
AND THE COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 9. 
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14, 2000, at 5 p.m., which, according to Clayton, the Department had 
no authority to waive. 
 The PBCCB responded to the Clayton opinion on the mandatory 
recount issue by seeking an advisory opinion on the same question 
from Florida Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth, who like Sec-
retary Harris was a campaign co-chair for one of the presidential 
candidates—in Butterworth’s case, for Gore.100 Butterworth dis-
agreed vehemently with Clayton’s conclusion on this issue. He noted 
first that the error that, under section 102.166, triggers a mandatory 
countywide recount, is not an error in “the vote tabulation system,” a 
phrase used elsewhere in the statute, but “an error in the vote tabu-
lation” or enumeration itself.101 It was Butterworth’s view that, when 
referring to a tabulation system rather than to a vote count, the Flor-
ida Legislature consistently used the terms “vote tabulation system” 
and “automatic tabulating equipment.”102 Having rejected on plain 
language grounds the notion that “an error in vote tabulation” meant 
only an error in the vote tabulation system, Butterworth argued: 
“[An] error in vote tabulation might be caused by a mechanical mal-
function in the operation of the vote counting system, but the error 
might also result from the failure of a properly functioning mechani-
cal system to discern the choices of the voters as revealed by the bal-
lots.”103 Butterworth buttressed his conclusion by observing that sec-
tion 102.166 dictates recount procedures that include a process for 
discerning voter intent from visually inspected ballots.104 Moreover, 
Clayton’s distinction between failures to count “properly” marked or 
punched ballots and failures to count ballots that were “improperly 
marked” could not be sustained because Florida election law does not 
specify how a ballot is to be punched or marked; rather, it contem-
plates that the discernability of “voter intent” shall be the sole legal 
standard that renders a ballot countable.105 Butterworth demon-
strated that a substantial line of Florida Supreme Court decisions 
dating to early in the twentieth century confirmed his reading.106 In 
short, the PBCCB’s discovery of a substantial number of Gore votes 
that were plainly intended by the voters, but not read by the me-
chanical system meant that an “error in vote tabulation” had oc-
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curred, triggering the Board’s obligation to conduct a comprehensive 
recount. 
 In the meantime, the Volusia County Canvassing Board had gone 
to Florida Circuit Court to seek a temporary injunction against Sec-
retary Harris and the Department of State that would require them 
to consider—even after 5 p.m. on November 14—the certified results 
from counties that could not complete by that deadline the county-
wide recounts they were legally required to hold. On November 14, 
Circuit Judge Terry P. Lewis granted the requested relief, in part.107 
According to Judge Lewis, Secretary Harris erred in insisting that 
only an “Act of God” would permit her legally to consider the inclu-
sion in state totals of county returns that were submitted after the 
seven-day deadline. In Judge Lewis’s view, Harris’s insistence on 
early finality ignored the legislature’s countervailing interest in vote 
count accuracy.108 Florida law appeared to anticipate a number of 
situations in which a manual recount would be called for even if it 
could not be completed within seven days. “It is unlikely,” he wrote, 
“that the Legislature would give the right to protest returns, but 
make it meaningless because it could not be acted upon . . . .”109 
 To give effect to the legislature’s interests in both finality and ac-
curacy, as well as the language of the statute, Judge Lewis concluded 
that counties were required to report existing vote totals by 5 p.m. on 
the seventh day following an election.110 Counties were also entitled, 
however, to decide to file late returns, which would be included or not 
within the state count, as the Secretary of State would be entitled to 
determine within her discretion: 
[T]he Secretary of State has the authority to exercise her discre-
tion in reviewing that decision [to submit late returns], considering 
all attendant facts and circumstances, and decide whether to in-
clude or to ignore the late filed returns in certifying the election 
results and declaring the winner. . . . [T]he Secretary cannot decide 
ahead of time what late returns should or should not be ig-
nored . . . .111 
Judge Lewis determined, however, that he could not direct Secretary 
Harris as to how to exercise her discretion.112 He could go no further 
than indicate that “the exercise of discretion, by its nature, contem-
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plates a decision based upon a weighing and [a] consideration of all 
attendant facts and circumstances.”113 
 Secretary Harris’s response to this decision was audacious. One 
might have thought that among “all attendant facts and circum-
stances” worthy of consideration in determining whether to include 
late filed returns would be the substance of those returns. Yet, the 
afternoon of Judge Lewis’s order, Secretary Harris responded by in-
structing all counties to report no later than 2 p.m. the following day 
a statement of those facts and circumstances that, in the views of the 
respective counties, would justify her inclusion of their late filed re-
turns.114 She wrote an additional letter the following day, specifying 
the criteria under which she intended to exercise her discretion: 
Facts & Circumstances Warranting Waiver of Statutory Deadline 
 1. Where there is proof of voter fraud that affects the outcome 
of the election. 
 2. Where there has been a substantial noncompliance with 
statutory election procedures, and reasonable doubt exists as to 
whether the certified results expressed the will of the voters. 
 3. Where election officials have made a good faith effort to 
comply with the statutory deadline and are prevented from timely 
complying with their duties as a result of an act of God, or extenu-
ating circumstances beyond their control, by way of example, an 
electrical power outage, a malfunction of the transmitting equip-
ment, or a mechanical malfunction of the voting tabulation system. 
Facts & Circumstances Not Warranting Waiver of Statutory Dead-
line 
 1. Where there has been substantial compliance with statu-
tory election procedures and the contested results relate to voter 
error, and there exists a reasonable expectation that the certified 
results expressed the will of the voters. 
 2. Where there exists a ballot that may be confusing because 
of the alignment and location of the candidates’ names, but is oth-
erwise in substantial compliance with the election laws. 
 3. Where there is nothing “more than a mere possibility that 
the outcome of the election would have been effected.”115 
Following this advice, four counties—Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm 
Beach, and Volusia—all filed letters expressing an intention to 
submit late-filed returns.116 That afternoon, Secretary Harris an-
nounced her rejection of each of these requests.117 When Volusia 
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County protested this decision to Judge Lewis, he determined, on 
Friday, November 17, that Harris had “exercised her reasoned judg-
ment to determine what relevant factors and criteria should be con-
sidered, applied them to the facts and circumstances pertinent to the 
individual counties involved, and made her decision.”118 This, he con-
cluded, fulfilled his prior order. 
 In the meantime, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida had refused the Bush request to block any manual re-
counts, a decision he appealed on November 15.119 On November 16 
and 17, the Florida Supreme Court denied a request by Harris to 
block the recounts,120 agreed to resolve the dispute between Harris 
and Attorney General Butterworth regarding the hand counts’ legal 
basis,121 and stayed any certification of the election by Secretary Har-
ris while it heard the case.122 On Friday, November 18, the final day 
for the counting of overseas ballots, new statewide totals were an-
nounced, expanding the Bush lead to 930.123 
 With these events, the ground had been laid for the first of four 
utterly critical judicial events—a decision on the merits by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court about the legality of hand recounts prior to a cer-
tification of a statewide winner in the presidential race. After hear-
ing oral arguments on Monday, November 20, the Court issued on 
November 21 its unanimous ruling that (a) the hand counts could 
continue, and (b) that Secretary Harris was obliged to include in the 
state totals any returns submitted by the counties involved by No-
vember 26, 2000.124 
 Now, to get a full perspective on the implications of the Due Proc-
ess Clause for the Florida vote, let us imagine a course of events that 
did not occur. Imagine that the Florida Supreme Court had decided 
differently and upheld Secretary Harris’s opinion that candidates 
could secure manual recounts only if the tabulation errors alleged 
were the result of fraud, noncompliance with statutory procedures, or 
an Act of God. Imagine further that, in the wake of that opinion, Al 
Gore had sued to demand a manual recount as an imperative of due 
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process in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties. 
This is my hypothetical case of Gore v. Harris.125 
 The law to be applied in my hypothetical case is the now well-
routinized due process doctrine that the Court crystallized in the 
1970s into an oft-cited, even if academically criticized, two-step 
analysis. The first question presented in procedural due process 
cases is whether the individual interest at stake qualifies as “liberty” 
or “property” entitling the interest holder to due process protection.126 
The second is whether, in light of the competing individual and gov-
ernmental interests at stake, additional decisionmaking procedures 
promise a sufficient likelihood of increased accuracy as to warrant 
their mandatory imposition.127  
 Gore would certainly have had no trouble establishing that the 
Due Process Clause protects the right to vote as a form of “liberty” or 
“property.” At one time, this might have seemed a difficult question 
because an obvious implication of the debates leading to the Four-
teenth Amendment and of the subsequent adoption of the Fifteenth 
Amendment is that Congress, in 1866, did not anticipate that Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect voting rights. Such 
was Justice Harlan’s position in his dissents in Reynolds v. Sims128 
and Carrington v. Rash.129  
 Beginning with the reapportionment cases, however, the Court 
has taken a consistent position that Section 1 does protect voting 
rights, resting chiefly on the “fundamental rights” strand of equal 
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candidate’s standing to vindicate the rights of voters. In my hypothetical case, as in the 
genuine litigation, there was no question that, in their respective suits, candidates Bush 
and Gore had each alleged sufficiently concrete injury to meet the federal constitutional 
requirements for standing. See Peter M. Shane, Returning Separation-of-Powers Analysis 
to Its Normative Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits 
to Enforce Civil Fines, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,081, 11,085-89 (2000) (reviewing the Supreme 
Court’s standing decisions with regard to the injury requirement). The issue that a federal 
court might have stopped to consider is whether it would nonetheless have been appropri-
ate to invoke the prudential rule against so-called third-party standing, which ordinarily 
bars even injured parties from seeking federal judicial intervention where the cause of 
their alleged injury is a violation not of their own rights but of another person’s. See Sin-
gleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). In this case, at least three factors argue persuasively 
for permitting the candidates to litigate their supporters’ rights: the close interrelationship 
of the candidate’s and voters’ interests, the certainty that the candidates would be vigorous 
proponents of the voters’ rights, and the possibility that direct voter suits might be de-
terred by uncertainty among the voters as to which of them were specifically affected by 
the state tabulation practices in dispute. Cf. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1151 
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protection analysis.130 It is hardly a leap from acknowledging the 
status of voting rights as fundamental for equal protection purposes 
to recognizing voting as a protected form of liberty under the Due 
Process Clause. 
 The question is made even easier, however, because of the Court’s 
current approach to the identification of protectible property inter-
ests under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the early 1970s, it has 
been the Court’s consistent position that an individual’s benefits or 
interests that are created by state law are protected “property” if 
they are subject to “rules or understandings that secure [such] bene-
fits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”131 That 
is, there must be “rules or mutually explicit understandings that 
support [a] claim of entitlement to the benefit and that [the benefici-
ary] may invoke at a hearing” involving the benefit in question.132 
Well-known examples of such protected interests include many gov-
ernment jobs,133 public assistance payments,134 government disability 
insurance,135 public education,136 and state licenses.137 
 The right to vote in Florida—and the implicit concomitant right of 
having one’s vote counted—is supported by explicit rules under Flor-
ida law. Section 97.041, Florida Statutes, prescribes the state’s quali-
fications to register and vote in categorical and nondiscretionary 
terms.138 There can be no doubt that Section 97.041 creates a protect-
ible property interest for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
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 The task a Gore suit would thus have presented, as the Supreme 
Court has put it, would be “identif[ying] . . . the specific dictates of 
due process”139 with regard to having one’s vote counted. The hypo-
thetical suit by Gore voters demanding a manual recount in selected 
counties would be based on the following claim regarding the adjudi-
catory process of vote tabulation. Florida has in place an array of me-
chanical and electromechanical systems for discerning voter intent. 
As interpreted by Secretary Harris, these mechanical and electrome-
chanical systems provide the exclusive means for discerning voter in-
tent absent fraud, noncompliance with statutory procedures, or an 
Act of God. Due process, according to Gore, would demand a manual 
review of the ballots in an additional category of circumstances: 
namely, whenever a candidate could establish a prima facie likeli-
hood that some failure had occurred, for whatever reason, for a 
county’s automatic tabulation system to count legally valid ballots of 
sufficient number to have swayed the electoral outcome. 
 The Court’s due process decisions have articulated a balancing 
rubric to assess what is reasonable in just this sort of procedural due 
process contest. As first crystallized in Mathews v. Eldridge: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally re-
quires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.140 
In other words, a due process challenge of the kind I am hypothesiz-
ing requires a court to compare the decisionmaking procedures 
sought by a plaintiff with the presumably more summary procedures 
offered already by the state authority being challenged. The court is 
to award the additional procedures sought (a) only if existing proce-
dures run the risk of erroneous results and (b) only if there is suffi-
cient value to the additional procedures, while (c) taking into account 
the relevant—and often competing—interests of the individual plain-
tiff and of the government.141 
 Despite widespread scholarly theoretical dissatisfaction with this 
particular three-part test,142 its application to my hypothetical Gore 
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suit is straightforward. In the wake of Florida’s electoral experience, 
there is no serious doubt that the state’s mechanical and electrome-
chanical systems run the risk of substantial error. Punch-card vot-
ing, in particular, appears to pose the danger of significantly inaccu-
rate tabulation. Florida law essentially concedes this risk because it 
provides expressly for manual recounting as a check on the error of 
mechanical and electromechanical systems. On this point, there is 
truly no contest. 
 That conclusion, however, simply moves us to the next step of the 
inquiry. What would be the value of additional procedures, in light of 
the competing interests involved of Florida’s voters and of the state 
government? As a general proposition, it can hardly be gainsaid that 
a manual inspection is valuable in addressing the erroneous tabula-
tion of ballots by mechanical and electromechanical systems. Again, 
this proposition is a major premise of the Florida law that applies to 
election protests—and is consistent with the laws of at least twenty-
seven other states that expressly contemplate the availability of 
manual counting.143 Especially in a state such as Florida, in which 
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6.1871 (Michie 2000) (authorizing manual recounts); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 204C.21 
(2000) (procedure for manual counts); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT. § 115.585 (2000) (provid-
ing for manual inspection of votes cast on paper ballots); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
16-412 (2000) (providing for manual inspection of votes cast on paper ballots); Nebraska, 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1114 (2000) (procedure to open and inspect ballots); Nevada, NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 293.423 (2001) (providing for opening and recount of ballots); New Hamp-
shire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660:5 (2000) (providing for manual recounts); New Jersey, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:53A-8 (West 2001) (providing for manual recounts when a count by 
tabulating equipment “becomes impracticable”); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-
16-01 (2000) (county auditor to review all ballots for recount); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3515.04 (Anderson 2001) (procedure for manual recounts); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 
26, § 8-114 (2000) (procedure for manual recounts); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 
3261 (West 2001) (providing for opening of ballot boxes and recounting of votes by persons 
designated by specified courts or judges); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-37.1 (2001) 
(authorizing candidate requests for manual recounts); Texas, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 
214.049 (Vernon 2000) (procedure for manual recounts); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 
2602 (2001) (providing detailed manual recount procedures); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 
24.2-802 (Michie 2001) (authorizing manual inspection of all ballots); Washington, WASH. 
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any ballot is lawful that expresses the intent of the voter in a dis-
cernible way, a manual count is the only means of discovering inten-
tions left unread because of either machine or voter error. 
 Whether or not the burden of such additional procedures is war-
ranted, however, depends upon the Supreme Court’s mandatory in-
terest balancing. With regard to the demand for recounts I have hy-
pothesized, that balance overwhelmingly favors Gore. Insofar as 
Gore’s rights were inextricably intertwined with the rights of those 
voters who supported him, Gore would have been invoking an indi-
vidual interest that the Supreme Court has characterized repeatedly 
as being of the highest order. As early as 1886, the Supreme Court 
described voting “as a fundamental political right, because preserva-
tive of all rights.”144 The Court’s modern equal protection voting ju-
risprudence is founded on this premise. 
 What, then, would be the state’s countervailing interests? A 
state’s usual interests in avoiding increased procedural formality are 
cost-savings, time-savings, and achieving finality in administrative 
decisionmaking. In this case, the financial interest, although genu-
ine, is hardly forbidding. The Court has never permitted cost-
savings, by itself, to be a deciding factor in a case involving substan-
tial individual rights. The time factor, of course, is potentially com-
pelling in an electoral context. With regard to the appointment of 
presidential electors, states surely have a critical interest in resolv-
ing disputes early enough to permit actual balloting in the Electoral 
College. Bush v. Gore was careless in its analyses of key deadlines, 
but, for purposes of my hypothetical, its mistakes are irrelevant. 
There is no real reason to doubt that manual counts in disputed 
counties could have occurred in timely fashion had they commenced 
promptly after election day. In assessing the state’s interest in 
promptness, moreover, as well as its closely related interest in final-
ity, it is worth recalling that, in any event, the state could not have 
certified final victors in the November 7 poll until November 17 be-
cause of the time legally required for the counting of overseas bal-
lots.145 Had hand counts proceeded expeditiously, it is probable they 
                                                                                                                    
REV. CODE § 29.64.015 (2001) (providing for manual recount unless candidates agree on al-
ternative procedure); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 3-6-9 (2001) (manual inspection proce-
dures); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 9.01(1)(b) (2000) (providing for manual inspection of bal-
lots). These do not include states in which manual recounting would appear to be within a 
state official’s broadly granted discretion, for example, Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 258.150 
(1999) (Secretary of State to determine most appropriate recount method), or in which 
manual recounting is authorized only upon a demonstration that automatic vote count 
technologies had failed, for example, Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-11-107 (Michie 2001) 
(recount made by alternate method if automatic tabulating equipment fails). 
 144. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 145. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7). 
With respect to the presidential preference primary and the general election, 
any absentee ballot cast for a federal office by an overseas elector which is post-
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could have been completed by November 17. In short, the state’s in-
terests in avoiding a manual count appear to be notably less singular 
and fundamental than the interest of each Florida voter in having 
his or her intentions accurately ascertained. 
 But even this does not tell the entire story. Any accounting for the 
state’s interests must take notice also of those state interests that ac-
tually favor a manual recount. It should hardly have required our 
current fiasco to remind us that any government stands to pay a dire 
price in lost legitimacy should its citizenry begin to lose faith that 
electoral results actually reflect the expressed intentions of the vot-
ing public. That risk would plainly loom largest in just that category 
of cases in which Gore would be insisting on the constitutionally 
mandatory status of manual recounts, that is, cases in which a can-
didate or voter had established a prima facie likelihood that a coun-
ty’s automatic tabulation system had failed to count legally valid bal-
lots of sufficient number to have potentially swayed the electoral 
outcome. These insights counsel powerfully for a state’s adoption of 
procedures that provide citizens a reasonable guarantee that the 
electoral connection between the people and their officials is a genu-
ine one. Where, as in this matter, a state’s own interests, fully ac-
counted for, militate in favor of additional procedural protections, the 
Supreme Court has deemed that fact relevant to the implementation 
of its due process calculus.146 
 Based on this analysis, the proper resolution to the hypothetical 
case of Gore v. Harris is plain: had the Florida Supreme Court up-
held Secretary Harris’s view of the law and had Vice President Gore 
demanded the recounts he sought under the Due Process Clause, he 
should have won his case. He had shown the challenged tabulation to 
be significantly in error. There was no doubt that a manual count 
had substantial potential to remedy the problems presented. A man-
ual count could have proceeded without compromising Florida’s in-
                                                                                                                    
postmarked or signed and dated no later than the date of the federal election 
shall be counted if received no later than 10 days from the date of the federal 
election as long as such absentee ballot is otherwise proper. 
Id. 
 146. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970):  
[W]elfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread 
sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not 
mere charity, but a means to ‘promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.’ The same governmental in-
terests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted 
provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings 
are indispensable to that end.  
Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (“In holding as we do, we do not believe that we 
have imposed procedures on school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a classroom 
setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which are, if anything, less than a 
fair-minded school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspen-
sions.”). 
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terest in a timely, final certification. The financial interest of the 
state in summary procedures would not have justified the risk that 
obviously existed of disenfranchising a significant number of those 
Floridians who cast intelligible ballots on November 7. Moreover, 
Florida’s interest in maintaining the confidence of the electorate in 
the accuracy and fairness of the state’s electoral system would actu-
ally have supported a Gore suit. 
 Of course, Al Gore did not seek to require manual counts in the 
four disputed counties under the Due Process Clause. Florida law 
promised him the very result he sought. The Florida Legislature—
without constitutional prodding by the federal courts—had already 
designed an electoral procedure that effectively tracks the require-
ments of due process. Florida statutes provided genuine opportuni-
ties for the administrative correction of tabulation error, including 
the possibility of manual recounts where necessary. They made such 
recounts mandatory upon a prima facie showing from sample pre-
cincts that “indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could af-
fect the outcome of the election.”147 The administrative process is sub-
ject to independent judicial review. Because the Florida Supreme 
Court upheld Gore’s view of the law, no other federal litigation may 
have seemed necessary. But reviewing the hypothetical case of Gore 
v. Harris provides a helpful demonstration of three things. The first 
is the amenability of the Florida electoral controversy to conventional 
due process analysis. The second is the importance of procedural due 
process in the tabulation of votes as a bulwark of democratic gov-
ernment. The third is that Gore was entitled to mandatory recounts 
in at least four counties not only because of Florida statutes, but also 
because of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court effec-
tively undercut democracy and deprived Gore voters of their consti-
tutional rights. 
C.   Applying Due Process II: The Real Case of Bush v. Gore 
 That brings us to the issue actually addressed by the per curiam 
opinion in Bush v. Gore: the threatened lack of uniformity in differ-
ent counties’ implementation of their manual recounts. A complex se-
ries of events had transpired since the Florida Supreme Court opin-
ion rejecting Secretary Harris’s view of Florida’s election protest law. 
On November 26, Harris certified Bush the winner in Florida, includ-
ing in her totals the results of recounts in Broward and Volusia 
Counties. She refused to include the Palm Beach recount totals, 
which had reached her office about two hours after the court-imposed 
deadline. There was also no comprehensive recount from Miami-
                                                                                                                    
 147. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000) (amended 2001).  
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Dade County, where the county canvassing board, through a tortur-
ous process, had finally decided that a countywide recount was ap-
propriate, but that the count could not be completed by the court-
imposed date. Harris refused to make adjustments based on the par-
tial recount of sample precincts.148 
 Following Harris’s certification, Gore filed a contest of the election 
in Leon County, which, under Florida law, is the proper venue for 
election contests involving more than a single county.149 The case was 
tried before Leon County Circuit Judge N. Sanders Sauls while the 
U.S. Supreme Court had under advisement Bush’s challenge to the 
Florida Supreme Court decision that had allowed the precertification 
recounts to continue. On December 4, both the Supreme Court and 
Judge Sauls acted. The Supreme Court refused to address Bush’s 
supposed federal issues on the merits, but nonetheless vacated and 
remanded the Florida Supreme Court’s November 21 opinion for 
clarification with regard to two questions of dubious legal rele-
vance.150 Judge Sauls rejected Gore’s contest on the ground that he 
had failed to prove a “reasonable probability” that the election would 
have turned out differently if not for the problems he identified in 
counting ballots.151 On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
Bush’s request for an injunction against manual recounts.152 The next 
day, the Florida Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Gore 
appeal from Judge Sauls’s ruling. On December 8, the Florida Su-
preme Court decided, four to three, not only to grant Gore the relief 
he requested, but also to direct the circuit court to order the relevant 
officials “in all counties that have not conducted a manual recount or 
tabulation of the undervotes in this election to do so                   
forthwith . . . .”153 Judge Sauls recused himself from implementing 
the court’s mandate154 and was replaced by Leon County Circuit 
Court Judge Terry Lewis. Despite Judge Lewis’s immediate steps to 
implement the mandate, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the recount 
by a five to four vote on December 9.155 After oral arguments on De-
                                                                                                                    
 148. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000); Tim Collie & Mark Hollis, Bush Claims Win, Gore Fights Count, 
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 27, 2000, at 1A, available at 2000 WL 
28992947. 
 149. FLA. STAT. § 102.1685 (2000).  
 150. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 151. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000), rev’d 
772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), reprinted in 
BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY, supra note 67, at 53, 55. 
 152. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000); Touchston v. McDermott, 234 
F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1061 (2001). 
 153. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
 154. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1801773 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000). 
 155. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
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cember 10, the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore on December 
12.156 
 What the Bush suit effectively asked the Supreme Court to do was 
to judge the fairness of the system of mass adjudication that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court had put into place in order to determine the reso-
lution of the Gore election contest. That process, in essence, was to 
consist of seven elements: 
1. All counties that had not conducted a manual recount or tabula-
tion of the undervotes since Election Day were to conduct such 
tabulations in the respective counties.157 
2. Miami-Dade would tabulate by hand approximately 9,000 bal-
lots, which its counting machine had registered as non-votes, but 
which not been manually reviewed as part of its earlier partial re-
count.158 
3. Ballots would be counted (and thus treated as legal) throughout 
the state if they revealed a “clear intent of the voter.”159 
4. The recounting would be done by as many two person teams in 
each county as would be required to complete the respective re-
counts in timely fashion.160 
5. If questions arose with regard to any ballot, they would be re-
viewed in each county by two circuit judges who, if they could not 
agree, would refer the matter for determination to Judge Lewis, 
who would preside over the statewide recount.161 
6. Both the Gore and Bush campaigns would be entitled to have 
observers watching every counting team. Objections to the treat-
ment of any ballot could be registered in writing by either observer 
and filed with the Clerk of the Leon County Circuit Court for 
Judge Lewis’s review.162 
7. A new statewide total would be certified to include the results 
from all recounts that occurred prior to November 26, the results 
from Palm Beach, the results from Miami-Dade’s pre-November 26 
partial recount, results from the recounts of the remaining Miami-
Dade undervotes plus recounted results in all remaining counties, 
and any adjustment Judge Lewis might order based on his review 
of any objections forwarded to him.163 
                                                                                                                    
 156. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 157. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1252-55. Statewide totals would be adjusted to in-
clude the additional votes in Palm Beach County for Gore that had been submitted within 
hours of the court’s earlier deadline, plus 168 votes from Miami-Dade County that had re-
sulted from that county’s earlier partial recount. Id. at 1260. 
 158. Id. at 1258-59. 
 159. Id. at 1257. 
 160. See Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, at 2 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2000) (Florida Re-
count General Instructions), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808-
61.pdf. 
 161. Id. at 5. 
 162. Id. at 2-3. 
 163. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
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 The majority per curiam opinion, in turn, identified the five fol-
lowing aspects of the foregoing process as equal protection “prob-
lems”: 
1. “[T]he absence of specific standards to ensure . . . equal applica-
tion” of the “clear intent of the voter” standard;164 
2. The inclusion in the final statewide total recount results from 
Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade that were based on a com-
prehensive review of all ballots and not limited, as would be the 
recounts in other counties, to a review of so-called “undervotes”;165 
3. The possibility that the final statewide totals would be allowed 
to include only partial recount results from some counties, but 
complete totals from others;166 
4. The failure of the Florida courts to specify more precisely who 
would recount the ballots, while relying for dispute resolution on 
ad hoc teams of state judges who lacked training in handling and 
interpreting ballots;167 and 
5. Limiting the objection process to written objections to be adjudi-
cated after the recount, rather than during it.168 
In his dissent, Justice Souter agreed that the first problem resulted 
in “wholly arbitrary” differences in different counties’ treatment of 
ballots, and thus violated equal protection’s fundamental require-
ment of rationality.169 Justice Breyer stated that “principles of fair-
ness should have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard” be-
cause of the election’s “very special circumstances.”170 The “very spe-
cial circumstances” Breyer identifies are these: 
[T]he use of different standards could favor one or the other of the 
candidates since time was, and is, too short to permit the lower 
courts to iron out significant differences through ordinary judicial 
review, and . . . the relevant distinction [between strict and lenient 
standards] was embodied in the order of the State’s highest     
court . . . .171 
Because the majority, however, had called the recount off, he de-
clined to “decide whether, or the extent to which, as a remedial mat-
ter, the Constitution would place limits upon the content of the uni-
form standard.”172 
                                                                                                                    
 164. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000). 
 165. Id. at 107-08. 
 166. Id. at 108. 
 167. Id. at 109. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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 Of the five infirmities identified by the majority, it is difficult even 
to articulate how the reliance on unnamed volunteers and untrained 
judges or the limitation of the candidates’ protest to written objec-
tions to be decided by a single judge could amount to an equal protec-
tion problem. Truly, if these features compromised the fairness of the 
recount at all, they would be matters of due process, not equal treat-
ment.173 That leaves as articulable equal protection problems the dis-
parate treatment of ballots in different counties because of how dif-
ferent counties might implement the “clear intent of the voter” stan-
dard, the comprehensiveness of recounting in some counties as com-
pared to those that would re-inspect only “undervotes,” and the pos-
sible inclusion in the statewide total of some counties’ recounts that 
were only partial, rather than complete. 
 Except for the fact that these are, of course, differences, it is hard 
to see how they implicate “equal protection.” The per curiam opinion 
states: “The recount mechanisms implemented in response to the de-
cisions of the Florida Supreme Court do not satisfy the minimum re-
quirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure 
the fundamental right.”174 The majority does no more to explain this 
conclusion than simply to point to differences in the indicia of voter 
preference deemed to suffice as a matter of demonstrating voter in-
tent in Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Broward Counties. At most, 
there is a possible implication that the different practices identi-
fied—in the case of partial versus total recounts, a hypothetically dif-
ferent practice—might result in a different weighting of the votes in 
different counties. 
 The mere fact of differences among counties cannot plausibly be 
enough, however, to establish an equal protection violation. Different 
practices by different counties in implementing the law probably ex-
ist for every state administrative program in the country that states 
delegate to counties for implementation. There are undoubtedly dis-
cernible differences in county-administered adjudicatory programs in 
every state as varied as driver licensing and the certification of foster 
homes. With regard to the Florida election itself, there is no doubt 
that the biggest difference in the likelihood of registering voter intent 
in one county versus another was the variation in the voting machin-
ery employed. It is a safe bet that differences existed also among dif-
ferent counties in the degree of assistance afforded to confused vot-
                                                                                                                    
 173. The majority’s implicit thought regarding equality might be as follows: Judge 
Lewis’s remedial scheme would have left voters in counties with untrained but adept 
judges with some unspecified unjust advantage in comparison with voters in those counties 
whose untrained judges were also bad at their job. If this distinction were of constitutional 
magnitude, the Court would conceivably have found a reason to find the entire civil and 
criminal justice system of the United States unconstitutional. 
 174. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105. 
2001]                         DISAPPEARING DEMOCRACY 573 
 
ers, the inspectors’ willingness to provide new ballots to voters who 
inadvertently defaced theirs, and in the waiting times to cast votes—
all of which would surely produce differences in voter treatment that 
could have significant electoral impact.175 If the majority perceived it 
to be a constitutional problem that different vote count procedures 
could not be justified by any nonarbitrary rationale, then the Court 
was doubly misled. It was misled because none of the other differ-
ences I have articulated in election practice could be justified by any 
less arbitrary a rationale, and, in fact, all of them are justified on the 
same rational basis: namely, the state’s preference for empowering 
locally accountable officials with important local functions. 
 Nor is it at all clear how to apply the equality demands of the 
Court’s reapportionment jurisprudence. The race for presidential 
electors is statewide; every vote counts the same toward the final re-
sult, namely, 1/N, where N is the total number of legal ballots cast. 
The only intercounty difference on which the Court could be focusing 
is a marginal difference in the likelihood between counties that a 
particular voter’s ballot will be deemed to convey a “clear indication 
of voter intent.” The differences resulting, however, from the alleged 
infirmities identified by the Court are overwhelmed by the statistical 
differences imposed by the differences in voting machinery. And, in 
any event—even if this sort of difference is of the same constitutional 
seriousness as a departure from “one person, one vote”—the fact is 
that the Court does not demand perfect adherence to “one person, 
one vote” even in districted elections. The Court, for example, once 
approved an apportionment plan for the Virginia House of Represen-
tatives in which there existed among districts a maximum percent-
age variation from ideal equality of 16.4%.176 It approved a similar 
plan for Wyoming in which the average deviation from equality was 
16% and the maximum deviation 89%.177 The rationales behind these 
plans were hardly more compelling than the rationality of delegating 
                                                                                                                    
 175. Cf. Marcia Coyle, Gauging ‘Bush v. Gore’ Fallout, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 25, 2000-Jan. 1, 
2001, at A4: 
 In Iowa, where [University of Iowa Law] Prof. [Randall] Bezanson lives, opti-
cal scanners are used to tabulate votes, he said. Some counties program the 
scanners to reject “overvotes,” or double voting in a race. When the ballot is re-
jected, the machine spits it out and the voter, who is still present, is given a 
new ballot to correct the error. But other counties, he said, program the scan-
ners simply to reject the overvotes with no chance for correction. 
 “Is the inequality between those counties that follow a different set of pro-
gramming instructions a violation of the equal protection clause because there’s 
a systematic difference in the kinds of votes that are counted?” asked the pro-
fessor. Looking at the Bush-Gore per curiam, he added, “It’s very hard to ex-
plain why, as a matter of principle, that isn’t every bit as unconstitutional as 
the different recounting standards applied in different counties in Florida.” 
 176. Mahan v. State Bd. of Elections, 410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973). 
 177. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 839 (1983). 
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to local officials in Florida the discretion to decide how best to deter-
mine the “clear intent of the voter.” The resulting departures from 
equality were dramatically greater than anything that could have re-
sulted from the problems asserted to exist by the majority in Bush v. 
Gore with regard to the Florida statewide recount. 
 But the unpersuasiveness of the Court’s analysis should not end 
the inquiry into electoral fairness. The fairness of any recount proc-
ess in a presidential election is plainly critical to its legitimacy. As it 
happens, however, employing due process doctrine as the better 
framework for analysis would have shown that Florida law, not the 
Supreme Court majority opinion, embodied the sounder view of what 
fairness should have entailed. 
 Let me start with the two supposed equal protection problems 
that plausibly implicate the accuracy, as opposed to the consistency, 
of the recount. These are the failure of the Florida courts to rely ex-
clusively on officials trained in handling and interpreting ballots, and 
Judge Lewis’s determination to limit the objection process to written 
objections to be adjudicated after the recount rather than during it. 
Applying to these problems the Mathews v. Eldridge due process cal-
culus, it is obvious that neither is a problem of constitutional magni-
tude. It is speculative at best that some measure of training in han-
dling and interpreting ballots would lead to more reliable results 
than depending on volunteers under constant vigilance by represen-
tatives of the two parties, circuit judges whose good faith and profes-
sionalism could surely be presumed, and the watchful eye of Judge 
Lewis. As for the process of relying on written objections, rather than 
contemporaneous oral objections, it is hard to see why this would 
have any impact at all on the accuracy of ultimate determinations. In 
any event, neither practice would seem to threaten any significant 
prospect of disenfranchising Florida voters. And, the state’s rationale 
for these practices is a strong one, namely, finishing the electoral 
contest in time for Florida’s electors to vote. 
 The due process objections to the other alleged infirmities are of a 
different order. They do not actually address the putative accuracy of 
the court-ordered recount. They are better viewed as substantive due 
process objections to the alleged irrationality of the practices at issue. 
Two of these objections can be dealt with all but summarily. 
 First, the Court objected that “[t]he Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
sion thus gives no assurance that the recounts included in a final cer-
tification must be complete.”178 It might equally be said, however, 
that nothing in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision suggested that 
anything else would be the case. The Court’s mandatory inclusion in 
                                                                                                                    
 178. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 108. 
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the statewide certified totals of the precertification partial recount in 
Miami-Dade was simply consistent with its decision to include the 
results from all the precertification recounts. It was emphatically not 
the case, however, that the Miami-Dade partial recount was the end 
of the matter for Miami-Dade County. With regard to the remaining 
undervotes in Miami-Dade, Miami-Dade was to complete its recount 
in the same manner as every other county: by reviewing all the un-
dervotes. There would, in other words, be a complete and not a par-
tial total in Miami-Dade. 
 A second objection was that the Broward, Palm Beach, and partial 
Miami-Dade totals were included based on a comprehensive review of 
the ballots in question, while the recounts under Judge Lewis’s su-
pervision would be limited to undervotes in all other counties not re-
counted prior to certification.179 There was, however, an obvious ra-
tionale for this difference. The counties that completed comprehen-
sive recounts prior to certification were directed to do so by the statu-
tory provisions governing precertification election protests.180 The 
Florida Supreme Court recognized, however, that counties subject to 
the court’s December 8 order could not, as part of the post-
certification contest process, produce comprehensive recounts quickly 
enough to take whatever advantage the state might wish with regard 
to the safe harbor provision in federal law for the certification of 
state electors—a provision that required the Florida Supreme Court 
to complete the adjudicatory process by December 12. Given the im-
portance that the United States Supreme Court—however misguid-
edly—urged the Florida Supreme Court to attach to the federal safe 
harbor provision,181 it would be implausible to dismiss the Florida 
court’s attentiveness to that statute as unconstitutionally irrational. 
 That leaves only the variability within and among counties in the 
implementation of the “clear intent of the vote” standard as a possi-
ble source of objection. Examined in context, however, this variability 
is hardly a defect of constitutional magnitude. 
 As the majority notes, all relevant officials were aware of a single 
general standard governing the recount procedure; that is the “clear 
intent of the voter.” The majority conceded: “This is unobjectionable 
as an abstract proposition and a starting principle,” but added, “[t]he 
problem inheres in the absence of specific standards to ensure its 
equal application.”182 This thought was perhaps more helpfully sum-
marized by Justice Breyer: 
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 180. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000) (amended 2001).  
 181. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000). 
 182. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
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The majority concludes that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
that a manual recount be governed not only by the uniform gen-
eral standard of the “clear intent of the voter,” but also by uniform 
subsidiary standards (for example, a uniform determination 
whether indented, but not perforated, “undervotes” should 
count).183 
The problem, that is, lay not with the absence of a uniform standard, 
but with the absence of sufficiently precise and uniform subsidiary 
standards. 
 If that were so, of course, the fault would lie not with the Florida 
Supreme Court, but with the Florida Legislature because it specified 
no standard other than “the clear intent of the voter” as pertaining 
under Florida law to the evaluation of uncertain ballots. Had the 
Florida Supreme Court promulgated “uniform subsidiary standards” 
to define the legislative standard more precisely, it would surely 
have been accused of violating due process by changing the rules of 
vote counting after the election. Earlier judicial opinions gave no 
grounds for divining any subsidiary standards, and the court’s cau-
tion could only have been greater because the Supreme Court, in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, had intimated the 
rather unlikely proposition that any judicial elaboration upon the 
state’s statutory law might even violate Article II.184 
 But there are three more fundamental objections to the Supreme 
Court’s disparagement of Florida’s lack of subsidiary standards. The 
first is that there would likely be so many ways in which an inspec-
tor, reasonably and in good faith, could believe she had discerned a 
clear voter intent or the absence of it that any precise subsidiary 
standard would itself involve some degree of arbitrariness. Compli-
cating the process through the imposition of arbitrary sub-rules may 
not have seemed necessary to achieve reasonably accurate results. It 
would not have been a surprising experience for officials involved in 
the recounting efforts that, after reviewing some substantial number 
of ballots, they would find themselves with shared and well-
understood common sense norms sufficient to produce relatively con-
sistent results for each counting team and county canvassing 
board.185 It is not clear that subsidiary standards would have im-
proved accuracy and fairness to any real extent—at least if “the clear 
intent of the voter” were to remain the governing primary standard. 
 That point brings up the second critical objection to the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of standards. Because “clear intent of the voter” was 
                                                                                                                    
 183. Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 184. 531 U.S. at 76-77. 
 185. Cf. Tom Collins, Absent a Clear Statute, Broward Judge Says He Turned to Com-
mon Sense to Consider Chads, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Feb. 2, 2001, at C1, available at 
Westlaw MIAMIDBR database. 
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the legislatively prescribed standard, a good argument exists under 
Florida law that any subsidiary standard could operate as no more 
than a burden-shifting device. In other words, subsidiary standards 
consistent with the law might have provided, for example, that dim-
pled chads, in and of themselves, should not automatically be deemed 
conclusive as to voter intent. It might well have violated Florida law, 
however, to deny either party the possibility, even under subsidiary 
standards, of arguing that a dimpled chad on a particular ballot did 
meet the Florida statutory standard of “clear intent of the voter.” To 
deny that possibility would have been to amend Florida’s statutory 
standard. 
 The third, and perhaps most important point, is that Judge Lewis 
sat at the anticipated end of the recounting process to iron out any 
unjustifiable inconsistencies. That is, the availability of a single ad-
judicator to determine whether one ballot was treated too easily as 
evidencing clear intent or another was excluded too stringently of-
fered a structural assurance of consistency across counties. So long 
as the state’s attempt at insuring consistency is reasonably meaning-
ful, as this was, the demands of due process are satisfied. 
 None of this is to apologize for the ways in which Florida’s system 
departed from ideal administrative justice. The state would surely 
have been better served had all relevant decisionmakers simply ig-
nored the federal safe-harbor provision and pursued comprehensive 
statewide recounts with yet more time for judicial review as the in-
strument of achieving tolerable consistency. But the level of inconsis-
tency alleged with regard to Florida’s vote tabulation is of no differ-
ent order than we live with regularly under virtually every system of 
mass adjudication. 
 In a famous study of social security adjudication in the 1970s, 
Jerry Mashaw discovered variations among federal administrative 
law judges in granting social security disability awards at rates rang-
ing from under ten to over eighty percent of their respective 
caseloads. Moreover, and quite startlingly, he was not able to find 
through statistical analysis any systematic differences in the cases or 
caseloads confronting the Administrative Law Judges that accounted 
for these different rates of award. In other words, the only good pre-
dictor of a litigant’s likelihood of recovering a social security award in 
a social security hearing was the identity of the Administrative Law 
Judge.186 This may have been a deplorable feature of the social secu-
rity system, but there was and there is no well-founded theory of due 
                                                                                                                    
 186. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 21 (1978); JERRY L. MASHAW, 
RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
LAW SYSTEM 411-12 (4th ed. 1998). 
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process law under which it could have been judged unconstitutional. 
The same statement is equally true of Florida’s aborted recount. 
 In short, despite the Court’s identification of real and potential 
variations among counties and their vote counters in their treatment 
of ballots, the majority did not provide an analytic framework under 
either equal protection or due process that justified terminating the 
recount on grounds of unconstitutionality. None of the differences in 
vote counting process identified by the majority as an equal protec-
tion problem represented an intentional effort to disenfranchise any 
identifiable group. All were the by-product of a feature of state gov-
ernance long treated as reasonable, namely, state deference to county 
administrative discretion in the implementation of statewide admin-
istrative mandates. Of course, even in such circumstances, if some 
fundamental question of unfairness to individual voters were to 
arise, then the ground would exist for judicial intervention in the 
name of due process. But the effect of the Supreme Court’s interven-
tion was not to remedy unfairness to individual voters; it was to pre-
vent the State of Florida from undertaking a good faith effort to as-
certain the intentions of as many of its voters as possible. 
 The Bush v. Gore majority ignored a lesson made abundantly 
clear from the hypothetical case discussed above of Gore v. Harris: 
the importance of procedural due process in the tabulation of every 
voter’s ballot as a bulwark of democratic government. In that spirit, 
the one thing due process should have guaranteed in Florida was a 
manual recount in those counties where either candidate could make 
out a prima facie showing that, for whatever reason, some failure 
had occurred for for a county’s automatic tabulation system to count 
legally valid ballots of sufficient number to have swayed the electoral 
outcome. Gore had effectively made such a showing in four counties. 
Florida’s judicial system was well on its way to fulfilling the de-
mands of due process. It is the Supreme Court of the United States 
that was the primary agent of unfairness in this episode. 
III.   REAL DEMOCRACY: BUSH V. GORE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
RESTRAINT 
 Upon his elevation to the Supreme Court, Justice Lewis Powell 
decided to refrain from voting in presidential elections lest it com-
promise, however indirectly, the appearance or reality of his obliga-
tion to remain impartial.187 By contrast with that display of heroic 
self-restraint, the current Supreme Court’s conservative majority has 
created an unsettling appearance of wanting to vote for President not 
only on Election Day, but to do so as often as necessary thereafter. 
                                                                                                                    
 187. Telephone Interview with John C. Jeffries, Jr., Dean, University of Virginia 
School of Law, Justice Powell’s biographer and former clerk (July 2, 2001). 
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The arrogance of five Justices in bringing a presidential election to a 
halt by a one-vote judicial majority will likely haunt history’s ap-
praisal of every other bit of this right-wing faction’s jurisprudential 
corpus—and it should. If any value should be paramount in constitu-
tional review of a presidential election, it is the value of democracy. 
Democracy’s nonappearance among the concerns of the Bush v. Gore 
majority is stunning, especially in light of the Rehnquist Court’s or-
dinary solicitousness toward protecting political processes against 
judicial intervention, especially at the state and local level. 
 There is ample evidence of the majority’s tendentiousness.188 The 
seriousness with which the Court’s earlier opinion in Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board treated Bush’s near-frivolous Arti-
cle II argument,189 Justice Scalia’s reasons in support of the decision 
to stay the judicially ordered recount in Florida,190 and the utter im-
                                                                                                                    
 188. An especially disturbing feature of the lack of restraint in Bush v. Gore is the ap-
parently close alignment of various Justices with conservative electoral politics. One much-
reported and especially distressing incident in this vein was recounted in the press as fol-
lows: 
 [A]t an election night party on Nov. 7, surrounded for the most part by 
friends and familiar acquaintances, [Justice Sandra Day O’Connor] let her 
guard drop for a moment when she heard the first critical returns shortly be-
fore 8 p.m. 
 Sitting in her hostess’ den, staring at a small black-and-white television set, 
she visibly started when CBS anchor Dan Rather called Florida for Al Gore. 
‘This is terrible,’ she exclaimed. 
 She explained to another partygoer that Gore’s reported victory in Florida 
meant that the election was ‘over,’ since Gore had already carried two other 
swing states, Michigan and Illinois. 
 Moments later, with an air of obvious disgust, she rose to get a plate of food, 
leaving it to her husband to explain her somewhat uncharacteristic outburst. 
John O’Connor said his wife was upset because they wanted to retire to Ari-
zona, and a Gore win meant they’d have to wait another four years. 
Dave Zweifel, Ruling for Bush Fits Justice’s Plans, THE CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), 
Dec. 27, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24299725. That a Supreme Court Justice would at-
tend a social gathering for watching the presidential returns alone suggests an insensitiv-
ity to the appearance of impartiality that ought govern the members of the Court. 
 189. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76-77. There is no evi-
dence, in originally granting legislatures the authority to determine how presidential elec-
tors would be appointed, that the Framers intended to restrict the authority of states to de-
limit the powers of their respective legislatures through state constitutions or judicial re-
view. See 5 ELLIOTT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 338 (1996). 
 190. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare the 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis three days earlier: 
 At this time, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a threat of continuing irreparable 
harm. At the moment, the candidate Plaintiffs (Governor Bush and Secretary 
Cheney) are suffering no serious harm, let alone irreparable harm, because 
they have been certified as the winners of Florida’s electoral votes notwith-
standing the inclusion of manually recounted ballots. Moreover, even if manual 
recounts were to resume pursuant to a state court order, it is wholly specula-
tive as to whether the results of those recounts may eventually place Vice 
President Gore ahead. . . .  
 Nor are the voter Plaintiffs (all of whom allege that they voted for Governor 
Bush and Secretary Cheney) suffering serious harm or facing imminent injury. 
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plausibility of the majority’s remedial opinion in Bush v. Gore all 
suggest a Court not merely wrong, but reckless.191 Also, and perhaps 
most telling, is the dissonance between the per curiam opinion and 
its authors’ previously articulated jurisprudential commitments. This 
particular majority’s disregard for federalism and its sudden em-
brace of equal protection analysis at its most fastidious is only ren-
dered more suspect by the self-declaration that the Justices may be 
writing a ticket for one ride only: “Our consideration is limited to the 
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election 
processes generally presents many complexities.”192 
 Among the jurisprudential commitments abandoned is these Jus-
tices’ prior commitment to the political question doctrine. Bush v. 
Gore can be usefully compared, for example, to Nixon v. United 
States,193 in which the Court confronted a challenge by an impeached 
                                                                                                                    
No voter Plaintiff claims that in this election he was prevented from registering 
to vote, prevented from voting or prevented from voting for the candidate of his 
choice. Nor does any voter claim that his vote was rejected or not counted. . . . 
Even assuming Plaintiffs can assert some kind of injury, they have not shown 
the kind of serious and immediate injury that demands the extraordinary relief 
of a preliminary injunction. Additionally, any alleged voter injury, unrelated to 
the outcome of the election certified by the Florida Secretary of State, can be 
adequately remedied later. And although these Plaintiffs assert that Florida’s 
existing manual recount scheme must be invalidated for now and in the future, 
no one suggests that another election implicating those procedures is underway 
or imminent. 
 Plaintiffs’ other allegations of irreparable injuries to justify a preliminary in-
junction are unconvincing. The candidate Plaintiffs contend that if the manual 
recounts are allowed to proceed, simply rejecting the results of those recounts 
after the conclusion of this case will not repair the damage to the legitimacy of 
the Bush Presidency caused by “broadcasting” the flawed results of a recount 
that put Vice President Gore ahead. But . . . we reject the contention that merely 
counting ballots gives rise to cognizable injury. 
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1177 (11th Cir. 2000) (second emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 191.  
 In the interest of finality, . . . the majority effectively orders the disenfran-
chisement of an unknown number of voters whose ballots reveal their intent—
and are therefore legal votes under state law—but were for some reason re-
jected by ballot-counting machines. It does so on the basis of the deadlines set 
forth in Title 3 of the United States Code. But, as I have already noted, those 
provisions merely provide rules of decision for Congress to follow when select-
ing among conflicting slates of electors. They do not prohibit a State from 
counting what the majority concedes to be legal votes until a bona fide winner 
is determined. Indeed, in 1960, Hawaii appointed two slates of electors and 
Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4, 1961, well after the 
Title 3 deadlines. Thus, nothing prevents the majority, even if it properly found 
an equal protection violation, from ordering relief appropriate to remedy that 
violation without depriving Florida voters of their right to have their votes 
counted. As the majority notes, “[a] desire for speed is not a general excuse for 
ignoring equal protection guarantees.”  
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 127 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 192. Id. at 109. 
 193. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
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and convicted federal judge to the procedures by which the Senate 
had removed him from office. Rather than taking evidence in plenary 
session, the Senate delegated that function to a committee.194 The 
Senate as a whole met only to review the Committee’s report and to 
hear such arguments as Judge Nixon was prepared to offer on his 
own behalf.195 Nixon argued to the Supreme Court that this proce-
dure denied him his constitutional right to be tried by the Senate.196 
 The Supreme Court unanimously determined that it would not in-
tervene in the matter. The majority, speaking through Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, held that the constitutional sufficiency of Senate proce-
dures for adjudicating impeachment controversies was a matter to be 
resolved exclusively by the Senate itself. The constitutional vesting 
in the Senate of “the sole Power to try all Impeachments”197 was 
deemed “a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department.”198 Moreover, the majority said, the word 
“try” in Article I was too general to engender “judicially manageable 
standards” for what would amount to a constitutionally sufficient 
trial.199 It is unmistakably dramatic testimony to the Court’s deter-
mination to respect Congress’s impeachment authorities that the 
Court was prepared to hold that, for purposes of enforcing Article I, 
Article III judges could not determine in a sufficiently rigorous way 
what ought to count as a trial.200 
 Nixon v. United States rests on sound institutional judgment. Im-
peachment is the sole constitutionally designated process for achiev-
ing judicial accountability for wrongdoing. It would have appeared an 
unseemly conflict of interest for the Court to have reserved to the ju-
diciary the power to oversee that very process. But the argument for 
eschewing involvement in the 2000 presidential election is surely 
even more compelling. For sitting Supreme Court Justices to adjudi-
cate which person shall be entitled to name their successors does 
unmistakable violence to constitutional checks and balances. Article 
II and the Twelfth Amendment are readily interpretable as embody-
ing a textually demonstrable commitment to Congress of the power 
to resolve all issues related to the proper tabulation of electoral 
                                                                                                                    
 194. See id. at 227. 
 195. Id. at 227-28.  
 196. Id. at 228.  
 197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 198. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
 199. Id. at 230. 
 200. Nixon was not the first occasion on which now-Chief Justice Rehnquist has been 
prepared to find a “political question” in the face of constitutional text that would seem 
susceptible to fairly conventional judicial interpretation. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 
996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (arguing that the issue whether the Consti-
tution authorizes Presidents to abrogate treaties unilaterally presents a political question). 
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votes. Indeed, Congress has enacted a detailed statutory scheme to 
make just that process possible.201 
 In making this point, I do not wish to suggest for a moment that 
Congress, like the Court, would not have felt the pull of the most bla-
tant partisan politics. The Clinton impeachment episode is a cau-
tionary tale with regard to relying on Congress to abide by long-
standing constitutional norms. The national experience with con-
gressional involvement in resolving the Hayes-Tilden presidential 
contest in 1876 is not heartening.202 But there are at least three rea-
sons why deference to Congress’s authority in this matter would have 
been far preferable to the Supreme Court’s adventure of December 
12, 2000. 
 The first is that, partisan pressure or not, Congress in 2001 would 
likely have had to deport itself with a degree of openness or “trans-
parency” that did not exist in 1876 for Congress and which does not 
exist in 2001 for the Supreme Court. To that extent, hope for Con-
gress to adopt a sound approach to the resolution of the Florida con-
troversy, if need be, would have had some rational basis. 
 Second, Congress—unlike the Supreme Court—if it discerned in-
firmities in Florida’s counting process, could have provided a resolu-
tion consistent with the fundamental objective of ascertaining Flor-
ida’s actual vote. That is, Congress could have provided by statute for 
a statewide recount under appropriate standards and procedures to 
which Congress could then have bound itself. This may have re-
quired compromises—Gore would probably have had to give up on 
“dimpled” chads; Bush would have had to concede the legality of in-
telligible ballots rendered unreadable to machines due to voter error. 
But the result would have provided at least a reasonable and publicly 
acceptable answer to the question, “For whom did Floridians vote?” 
 But the third reason is the most compelling. Even if Congress 
messed up, even if it cut deals behind closed doors, and even if it 
failed to deal reasonably with Florida’s difficulties in achieving an 
accurate count, a simple fact remains: if the people of the United 
States were unhappy with Congress on any such account, those 
members of Congress deemed responsible could have been voted out 
of office. One could hardly imagine a set of decisions in which democ-
ratic accountability is more important than those involved in the le-
gitimate political resolution of an election contest. By contrast, de-
spite the ineffable odor of partisanship that hangs over the Court’s 
opinion in Bush v. Gore, there is no politically appropriate response 
                                                                                                                    
 201. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994). 
 202. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 575-87 (1988); EDWARD STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 357-93 (1898). 
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to be levied against the responsible Justices themselves. The Court 
that decided Nixon v. United States should surely have known better. 
 The only counterargument I can think of is that the 2000 presi-
dential election might have seemed to present a profoundly signifi-
cant moment for the articulation of constitutional law. Had the Court 
used its authority to articulate the federal right to vote for presiden-
tial electors or had the Court engaged in an analysis of Florida’s vote 
count procedures that was grounded seriously in its well-established 
due process jurisprudence, then at least the Court might have 
claimed to be advancing the causes of fairness and of democracy in a 
manner true to the trajectory of our constitutional commitments to 
those values. Instead, it betrayed both. 
 I have written on other occasions that judicial activism can be 
constructive.203 For that to happen, however, two conditions must 
prevail. First, there must be a genuine defect in the political process 
that renders judicial intervention necessary to preserve constitu-
tional values. Second, there must be available to the judiciary a 
means of persuasively translating its commitment to constitutional 
values into sound law. That is, judicial creativity is constructive only 
if amenable to rendition as professionally credible constitutional doc-
trine based on acceptable forms of good faith legal argument. The 
doctrine has to be able to do the work of advancing its animating 
values as an articulation of adequately neutral principle to be per-
suasively applicable to foreseeable future cases.204 
 The activism of the Bush v. Gore majority plainly fails the second 
test. The Court’s prior equal protection jurisprudence does not sus-
tain the stringency of its scrutiny of intrastate procedural variations 
in the administration of elections. And, it will be interesting, to put it 
mildly, to see if the Supreme Court is willing to follow the holding of 
Bush v. Gore in any other case. 
 But, more to the point, the 2000 election did not trigger the first 
justification for judicial activism. It did not suggest the existence of 
any defect in our national political process that required creative ju-
dicial intervention. Justice Scalia’s line, “Count first, and rule upon 
legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that 
have the public acceptance democratic stability requires,”205 puts the 
matter exactly backward. Counting is precisely what democracy re-
                                                                                                                    
 203. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong with 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 228-29 (2000). 
 204. Contrary to the conclusions of Professor Pushaw, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603 (2001), these cri-
teria provide a fully principled basis for applauding the activism of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962), while deploring the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.  
 205. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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quires, and the Court’s implicit doubts about the capacity of Con-
gress to act responsibly in assessing the counting process expresses 
an astonishing distrust of political institutions to resolve essentially 
political disputes. Given the shallowness of the majority’s analysis, 
and the Court’s obliviousness to the genuine stakes in the contro-
versy before it, it is possible to say at least this much about what 
would have been Congress’s resolution of the Florida controversy—
Congress could have done no worse than the Court. In ignoring this 
possibility—as in ignoring the imperatives of due process for Florida 
voters and the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the right of 
citizens to participate in choosing presidential electors—the Bush v. 
Gore majority betrayed democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
 In resolving Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court had two democratic 
paths open to it. It could have deferred to Congress under the politi-
cal question doctrine, holding that the detailed textual provisions of 
the Constitution concerning presidential elections commit to Con-
gress the final resolution of the question whether any state has prop-
erly administered its appointment of presidential electors. Such a de-
cision would have furthered the cause of democracy by placing in the 
hands of elected officials the determination of our most important po-
litical contest. Alternatively, the Court could have adjudicated the 
constitutional issues before it with an eye to insuring that, to the 
maximum extent possible, the votes of all Florida voters actually 
counted in the presidential election. That would have required no 
more than the application of the due process clause to uphold the 
Florida Supreme Court’s judgment below—or, even more modestly, 
the simple rejection on grounds of insubstantiality of the Bush chal-
lenges to the Florida hand count process. 
 Unlike the majority’s cut-from-whole-cloth equal protection analy-
sis, either of these approaches would have required nothing other 
than the conventional application of precedent. Nixon v. United 
States would have amply justified deference to Congress. The entire 
line of procedural due process jurisprudence since the 1970s would 
have supported affirmation of the Florida Supreme Court’s approach 
to vote counting. 
 But, whatever the majority’s concerns, adhering to conventional 
approaches to constitutional application was not among them. With-
out even a glance at the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority com-
menced its legal analysis with an assertion and reiteration that the 
citizens of each state have no constitutional entitlement to partici-
pate in the appointment of presidential electors. The majority’s 
premise takes no serious account of the text of the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, its history, nearly universal practice since 1868, and 
the conspicuous deepening of our constitutional commitment to de-
mocracy in the ensuing 132 years. The failure even to address these 
issues mocks the majority’s supposed commitments to textualism and 
originalism in other contexts. 
 History will record that, in resolving a dispute over the world’s 
most important elected office, the Supreme Court penned an opinion 
in which our national commitment to democracy—indeed, the very 
word, “democracy”—does not appear. Those who hope that a decent 
presidential performance by the Court’s designated victor will mini-
mize the harm to the Court’s reputation and legitimacy are whistling 
in the dark. The precedent of such judicial usurpation poses grave 
long-term peril to both democracy and the rule of law that is not sus-
ceptible to ready eradication in the short run—surely not by a law-
abiding nation’s prudent resignation to the formality, at least, of gov-
ernment by the winner. Only future courts’ repudiation of Bush v. 
Gore can begin to erase the stain. 
